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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court's decision to appoint counsel to represent the defaulting Dr. G.
Gregory Drezga ("Drezga") and then to order The Doctors1 Company ("TDC"), Drezgafs
adversary, to pay for that representation is without precedent in this Court. While courts
have authority to appoint counsel to represent indigent or criminal defendants, no court has
used that authority to appoint counsel to represent a defaulting defendant for the purpose of
protecting the interests of the defendant's creditor.

Also without precedent is the

enforcement of such an order on an attorney, such as Petitioner Paul C. Burke ("Burke"), who
has never had a relationship with Drezga, has no knowledge of whether Drezga wants
representation, and has absolutely no knowledge of how Drezga wishes to be represented.
Such an attorney faces peril under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct ("Conduct
Rules"). The district court abused its discretion in ordering Burke to represent Drezga.
While the substantive arguments weigh heavily in favor of granting Burke's Petition
for an Extraordinary Writ ("Petition"), Judd has filled her brief with an onslaught of
unnecessary and vitriolic personal attacks that veer wildly from the record and into the
dangerous terrain of blatant misrepresentation. In trying to tell a story much different from
the record, Judd introduces a series of "myths" that must be exposed. The first myth
concerns the role of Drezga's malpractice counsel, David Slagle ("Slagle"). Judd falsely
accuses TDC and Slagle of "collusion" against Drezga's interests. However, nothing but
Judd's empty rhetoric suggests there was any collusion between TDC and Slagle. The second
myth Judd introduces is that the district court relied on its "inherent authority" to appoint

1

counsel. In fact, the district court never discussed its "inherent authority"—the first reference
to "inherent authority" appears in Juddfs brief to this Court. The third and most damaging
myth Judd perpetuates is that TDCs counsel has acted unprofessionally, or that TDC has
intentionally delayed resolution of this action. The district court's repeated compliments on
the professionalism of TDCs counsel belies Juddfs recasting of the record. These myths must
not distract from the proper analysis of the Petition.
TDCfS RESPONSES TO JUDDVS STATEMENT OF FACTS
Juddfs "Statement of Relevant Facts" is filled with argument and misrepresentations
about the record and TDCs conduct. These "facts," written to suggest a conspiracy against
Judd, are almost uniformly irrelevant to Burkefs Petition and serve only to poison the Court's
perception of actual events. Such comments have no place in a brief filed with this Court.
Examining just a few of these "facts" demonstrates that Judd's story cannot be trusted. For
example, in trying to bolster the meritless claim of collusion, Judd refers to Slagle in Fact
No. 16 as "the defense counsel hired and arranged by TDC to represent Dr. Drezgafor
purposes of its summary judgment motion." This is utterly false: TDC never hired any
counsel to appear for Drezga in the declaratory action. Indeed, Slagle never entered an
appearance in the declaratory action. Affidavit of David Slagle ("Slagle Aff.") \ 4, attached
as Ex. A1; R. 1799 at 5. He only participated in the summary judgment hearing at the district
court's urging (R. 1799 at 5:8-9) and he told the court unequivocally, "I am not in this case.

J

To address Judd's inaccurate statements, TDC has cited material that is the subject of TDCs
Motion to Supplement the Record. TDC also includes citations to the existing record, where
appropriate, to compliment references to material outside the Record.
2

I do not represent anyone in this case." R.1799 at 5:12-13, 20:10-13. Slagle never
"cooperate[d],f with TDC in this action, as Judd suggests. Slagle Aff. f 19. Furthermore, in
Fact No. 8, Judd claims that Slagle improperly "passed on . . . federally protected
documents" to TDC showing Drezga?s fraud. Judd fails to tell the Court, however, that TDC
obtained these documents pursuant to a lawful Subpoena to which Judd never objected.
R.1799 at 33:19-20; Slagle Aff.ffl[13,19. Incredibly, in Fact No. 38, Judd describes Burke
as "replacement counsel," a term she repeats more than 70 times in her brief. Drezga never
had representation in this matter and describing Burke as "replacement counsel" is a blatant
distortion of fact.
This brief review provides the Court with a small taste of Juddfs abuse of the record.
Nevertheless, it should be apparent that these "facts" have nothing to do with the district
court's authority to appoint counsel or Burke's ability to serve. TDC sought a default on the
claims in the original Complaint (R. 557), not the Amended Complaint, rendering irrelevant
Juddfs theory that TDC colluded to obtain a default judgment. Furthermore, Judge Lewis
repeatedly commended TDC and its counsel. See infra Section III(B). There is no basis for
Juddfs bad faith rhetoric and the Court did not even hint that its Order was so premised.
Because Judd's "facts" are not germane to the Court's decision, it is unnecessary to
address them here. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ^ 33; 509
Utah Adv. Rep. 39. Nevertheless, to assist the Court in separating fact from fiction, TDC
attaches Addendum 1 to this brief, which responds to Judd's misstatements of fact.

3

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Contrary to Judd's assertions, the district court's decision to appoint counsel and the
terms of that appointment are reviewed for correctness. See Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905
P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) ("standard of review depends upon the issues presented on
appeal," and where the issue presents a question of law, it is reviewed for correctness,
"granting no particular deference to the trial court ruling").2
The Petition, as the Court acknowledged in its July 27,2004 Order, seeks "revocation
or clarification of the district court's order," is based on undisputed facts3 and presents
questions of law only concerning the authority of the court to appoint counsel for a defaulting
defendant in a civil case at the adversary's expense. Whether such an Order should be
"revoked" is purely a legal question of the court's authority. The second question, whether
the Order should be "clarified" to avoid conflict with this Court's Conduct Rules, similarly
is a legal issue that concerns this Court's 'special interest' in the administration of its rules,
an issue that Judd acknowledges is reviewed for correctness. Judd Br. at 4.
Ultimately, Judd's reliance on a "gross and flagrant" abuse of discretion standard is

2

The same standard was used in Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v.
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995), and Julian v. State of Utah, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah
1998).
3

Judd's experts both acknowledge that these issues are legal. "The legal ethics issue raised
. . . requires direct analysis of the relative roles of the Utah Rules and the legal issues that are
the province of Judge Lewis." Affidavit of Gary G. Sackett ("Sackett Aff.") R. 1300, ^ 12.
"If Judge Lewis has decided, as a matter of law, that Drezga's interests are entitled to
representation
" Id. ^f 24 (italics in original). "I offer no opinion on whether a Utah court
has the authority to appoint counsel for a party and to order another party to pay for it."
Affidavit of Thomas D. Morgan ("Morgan Aff.") R. 1319,16.
4

inconsistent with this Court's decisions. The cases Judd cites containing the "gross and
flagrant" language primarily are Court of Appeals decisions where the Legislature had
specifically denied a right of appeal that could be circumvented by granting extraordinary
relief.4 See Judd Br. at 2-3 (citing Utah County v. Alexanderson, 2003 UT App. 153; 71 P.3d
621 (cert, granted 78 P.3d 987 (2003); State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918; Renn v. Utah State
Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995)). The only instance in which this Court has
used such language was in reviewing actions of the Board of Pardons, from which appeals
are statutorily prohibited. See Renn, 906 P.2d at 683. Here, the concern that the Petition
might be used to circumvent a statutory prohibition on appeal is absent. Rather, the district
court made clear in ruling on Burke's Motion to Certify this Petition that appellate review
"must occur" in order "to proceed from this point." R. 1710. This Court's decisions in
Nelson, Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic and Julian all review legal questions in
extraordinary writs for correctness.
Here, the trial court made an unprecedented Order not authorized by contract, statute,
case law or the court's Rules. It was thus an abuse of discretion under any standard because

4f,

The Legislature has exactingly limited the judgments and orders from which the State may
appeal... Although the State brings its Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) claim as an original action, this
proceeding has the same characteristics, and seeks the same review and relief, as would a
statutory appeal
Hence, to avoid transforming this action into an impermissible appeal,
we must deny the State's request for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ of mandamus." Stirba, 972
P.2d 918,923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). See also Kee v. Lubeck, 2003 UT App. 177; Utah App.
Lexis 211 (not for official publication) (petition could be used to circumvent statutory
restrictions on an appeal). But see Alexanderson, 2003 UT App. 153, \ 8 (noting that review
for "gross and flagrant" error not limited to cases where an appeal is statutorily prohibited).
5

the very purpose of extraordinary relief is "to right fthe wrongful use of judicial authority/"
Judd Br. at 2 (quoting Osborne v. Adoption Ctr. of Choice, 2003 UT 15, f 26; 70 P.3d 58),
and the trial court's order appointing counsel would place counsel in jeopardy of violating
several of this Court's Conduct Rules. Ultimately, the Petition presents a pure question of
law: whether the trial court wrongfully used its judicial authority to appoint counsel for a
defendant who evaded service of process, placing the appointed counsel in jeopardy of
violating professional responsibilities, and in ordering TDC to pay for the defense of its
adversary. Being mindful that this Court has a 'special interest' in the administration of the
Conduct Rules (Spratley v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2003 UT 39 \ 8, 78 P.3d 603;
Judd Br. at 4), and because the issues presented are questions of law, the appropriate standard
is correctness.5
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS AUTHORITY TO APPOINT COUNSEL
FOR DREZGA AND COMPEL TDC TO PAY FOR DREZGAfS COUNSEL.
A.

TDC Has Standing to Challenge the District Court's Order.

Juddfs claim that TDC lacks standing is without merit. As Burke acknowledged, TDC
is the real party in interest as the party most directly affected by the district court's order
appointing counsel for Drezga. R. 1768-1770. Moreover, TDC meets the three standing
requirements in an extraordinary relief proceeding set forth in Society of Professional

5

Both Burke and Judge Lewis agree that where the underlying issue is a question of law, the
trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness. Judge Lewis Br. at 1; Burke Br. at 2.
6

Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987). First, TDC had standing to
challenge the district court's order appointing counsel below. R. 621. Second, the challenged
ruling is adverse to its interests because it impacts TDC's ability to pursue a default and
constitutes a monetary award against TDC. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. May field, 923
S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tex. 1996) (f![requiring a party to advance the litigation costs of the
opposition in addition to its own expenses so skews the litigation process that any subsequent
remedy by appeal is inadequate."), attached as Ex. E. Third, TDC appeared before the
district court and presented its claims. R. 1047-1057. Finally, this Court has recognized that
TDCfs "position is aligned with petitioner's." Order, July 27,2004, Burke v. Lewis, Case No.
20040500-SC. Given this alignment of interests, TDC satisfies standing requirements.6
B.

The District Court Does Not Possess Inherent Authority to Appoint
Counsel to Represent a Defaulting Defendant.

Abandoning her prior legal justifications, Judd now relies almost exclusively on the
court's "inherent authority1' to appoint counsel to support the district court's order. The slim
support for Judd's "inherent authority" argument is a cryptic statement in the October 10,
2002 Memorandum Decision ("Oct. 10 Decision") (R. 1427-1429):
The Court is confident that fair play and the interest ofjustice, as well as the legal
reasons set forth in the Court's prior opinions, dictate that counsel be appointed.

6

Judd has much greater problems with standing than TDC. Like TDC, Judd appears in this
proceeding only as a real party in interest. Absent express language in an insurance contract
in which the insurance company consents to be sued directly by an insured's judgment creditor,
the judgment creditor's exclusive remedy is to sue the insured. Davis County v. Jensen, 2003
UT App 444, If 17, 83 P.3d 405. The tortfeasor's victim "has no right of action against [the
insurance company] directly, and no means to impel [the insured] to obtain a settlement from
[the insurer] in order to satisfy its judgment." Id. f 18.
7

Id. at 1428. From this sentence, Judd extrapolates that the court was employing its "inherent
authority to appoint counsel." Of course, the basic flaw in Juddfs argument is that Judd
confuses the propriety of appointing counsel with the authority to appoint counsel. Whether
such appointment might be beneficial for a litigant says nothing about whether a court has
the power or authority to do so. Courts face countless circumstances in which "fair play and
the interest of justice" might be enhanced by the appointment of counsel for a litigant,
including a litigant who has defaulted.

Nevertheless, courts routinely enter default

judgments. As demonstrated below, the use of the court's "inherent authority" to appoint
counsel to represent a defaulting defendant is without precedent and the exercise of that
authority in these circumstances unquestionably is an abuse of discretion.
1.

Judd's "Inherent Authority" Argument is Made for the First Time on Appeal.

For the first time, Judd argues that the district court has "inherent authority" to appoint
counsel and she claims that authority alone is a sufficient basis to sustain the district court's
order. Nowhere in the nearly two-thousand page appellate record is there any reference to
either the court's "inherent authority" to appoint counsel or to any of the cases Judd now
cites. Before this Court will consider an issue on appeal, "the trial court must be offered an
opportunity to rule on [the] issue." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, \ 11; 44 P.3d 742 (citation
omitted). The district court never considered whether it had "inherent authority" to appoint
counsel—an unprecedented ruling TDC would have contested. The issue was not briefed
and the trial court never suggested that "inherent authority " was the basis for its ruling. Judd
ignores that the district court relied on "the Utah law alluded to by [Judd] in [her] moving

8

papers" to support the appointment of counsel. R. 1024. However, the only authority Judd
cited was Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997) (R. 654), a case Judd now labels
a "red herring." Judd Br. at 26.
2.

The Trial Court's "Inherent Authority" is Limited to Appointing Counsel to
Represent Indigent Parties, Not Defaulting Ones.

The rhetoric Judd carefully selects from Utah cases does not support Judd's new
"inherent authority" argument. At best, these cases suggest that the court may appoint
counsel to represent an appearing, indigent defendant, not a defendant who is in default and
has not expressed any interest in the litigation. In Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F.
Supp. 1221 (D.Neb. 1995), the court examined the historical and contemporary justifications
for appointment of counsel in a civil case, concluding:
If the lack of legal representation is the free choice of the unrepresented party or if it
results from factors unrelated to the indigency of the plaintiff our system is not
offended. Where, however, one party is unable to obtain legal representation because
of indigency, the resulting disparity of advocacy skills clearly offends the principle
of "equality before the law" underlying our system.
Id. at 1228 (emphasis added). This framework renders irrelevant Judd's vague argument
"that courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power" to render decisions that promote
justice between parties. Peterson v. Evans, 188 P. 152,153 (Utah 1920); Griffith v. Griffith,
1999 UT 78 f 13; 985 P.2d 255. Such a general proposition says nothing about whether a
court can appoint counsel for a defendant who maybe avoiding service of process (R. 941942), and order the defendant's adversary to fund both sides of the litigation. Juddfs "inherent
authority" argument is overstated. The Texas Supreme Court rejected an insured's "inherent
authority" argument in Travelers Indemnity Co., 923 S.W.2d at 594, Ex. E. The insured in
9

Travelers Indemnity, unlike Drezga, actually appeared and requested the appointment of
counsel. Id. at 591-592, Ex. E. The Texas Supreme Court granted extraordinary relief,
finding that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the insurer to pay for both sides
of the litigation. The court expressly limited appointment of counsel in civil cases to representation of indigent litigants and only in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 594,7 Ex. E.
Travelers Indemnity, like Bothwell, makes clear that it is only where a party is
indigent that a court can deploy its inherent authority to appoint counsel. Both Travelers
Indemnity and Bothwell presume that the party for whom counsel is appointed actually is
present, seeks representation and is participating in the litigation. This Court should not
reward Drezga's non-appearance through the appointment of counsel at his adversary's
expense. Cf. United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 628 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1975) (holding in
a criminal case that M[t]he administration of justice is not served by the court's unilateral
effort to activate the defense of a criminal case in which prosecution has been frustrated by
the defendant's flight from the jurisdiction.").
As in other jurisdictions, this Court has strictly anchored the court's power to appoint
counsel to either indigent or criminal defendants. See Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325
(Utah 1943) (tracing the historical roots of the inherent authority to appoint counsel and
holding that an attorney "can be compelled by the court to render gratuitous services in
defense of indigent[s]."); State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943) (holding that the court

7

In Travelers Indemnity, the court only addressed whether Ihe trial court had the power to
require the insurer to pay the claimant's fees. The court did not have to address whether the
trial court had the power to appoint counsel, which was conferred by statute. Id.
10

"has inherent power to direct an attorney to appear and defend one accused of crime."). In
this light, Judd's reliance on the Court of Appeals' decision in In Re J.DM., 810 P.2d 494,
498 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and its reference to "the inherent authority of courts to appoint
counsel when the need arises," is misplaced.
J.DM. involved representation of an indigent parent in a parental rights termination
action. The Court of Appeals interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-35(2), which provided a
right to counsel, and Rule 33 of the Utah State Juvenile Court Rules, which required courts
to "appoint counsel for the parties if it finds that they are indigent." Id. at 496. The J.DM.
Court ruled that § 78-3a-35(2)(a) gave the court "dispositive authority to determine when to
appoint counsel," and upheld the appointment to represent the indigent parent. Id. at 498.
In dicta, the court noted that this interpretation of the statute was consistent with the court's
authority to appoint counsel "when the need arises." Id. {citing Washington County v. Day,
447 P.2d 189, 191 (Utah 1968)). Consistent with this Court's prior rulings on "inherent
authority," it is plain that "need" described in J.DM. is a literal one: indigency. Other than
cases applying statutory or constitutional appointment powers, TDC has discovered no Utah
case upholding the appointment of counsel in any circumstance other than indigency or to
enforce a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel.
The Washington County, case cited in J.DM., reveals that the "inherent authority" to
appoint counsel is tied strictly to indigency. 447 P.2d at 191. Washington County involved
a criminal prosecution and interpretation of a statute providing representation for indigent
or criminal defendants. Id. In dicta, the Court stated, "it is true that the courts through their
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inherent power to prevent a miscarriage of justice have always zealously watched over the
rights of impecunious defendants and required counsel to give of their time and money to see
that a proper representation was made." Id. Thus, none of Judd's cited cases support the
expansive appointment powers Judd claims. These cases clarify that the court's "inherent
authority" to appoint counsel is limited to representation of indigent or criminal defendants.
3.

The Court Must Reject Judd's Unilateral "Findings of Fact" Concerning the
Grounds for the District Court's Decision.

Although Judd admits that the district court did not make any findings of fact to
buttress the "fair play" rationale for appointing counsel (Judd Br. at 25), Judd nevertheless
offers her own "findings of fact" to argue that counsel should be appointed because of TDCs
wrongful conduct. Juddfs radical reinterpretation of the district court's ruling merely relies
on the discredited myths described at the outset of this Argument and assailed in TDCs
Responses to Judd's Statement of Facts and in Addendum 1.
In saying what the district court did not, Judd boldly argues that TDC and Slagle
colluded to provide TDC access to protected information, appeared "side by side" at the
summary judgment hearing, and then Slagle "conveniently stepped aside" to enable TDC to
pursue a default judgment. JuddBr. at 25. These statements are false. First, Slagle provided
documents in response to a lawful Subpoena, showing Drezga committed fraud in procuring
insurance.8 R. 1799 at 33:19-20; see also Slagle Aff. % 13. Second, Slagle did not "appear

furthermore, Utah law specifically allows the disclosure of such information to an insurer.
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-31-104 (stating that "upon written request by an insurer to an
authorized agency, the authorized agency may release to the insurer information or evidence
that is relevant to any suspected insurance fraud. ");seealso § 31A-31-105;45 C.F.R. § 60.13
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side by side" with TDC at the summary judgment hearing. Slagle never represented either
Drezga or TDC in the declaratory action. R. 1799 at 5; Slagle f 4. The district court, not
TDC, invited Slagle to "come forward" and "pipe into the arguments" at the summary
judgment hearing. R. 1799 at 5:8-15; id. at f 6. Slagle immediately cautioned, "We really
are not involved in this case. We are involved in the underlying action." Id.
Finally, Slagle did not "step aside" to enable a default judgment. R. 1799 at 5; Slagle
Aff. f 17. Slagle had nothing to "step aside" from—he never represented Drezga in the
declaratory action. Although, at the district court's urging, Slagle said he would accept
service of an Amended Complaint, he advised the Court that Drezga had not given him
permission to do so (R.1799 at 29:12-14; Slagle Aff. If 9), and later wrote that he did not
believe anything in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permitted him to accept service in a
matter in which Drezga had not retained him. R. 539. Significantly, TDC never attempted
to influence Slaglefs conduct in any way and any suggestion of collusion is entirely false.
Slagle Aff. Tf 19. Judd's efforts to pile myth upon myth to create the appearance of foul play
is unfaithful to the record, the integrity of the district court's decision, and Judd's
responsibility to be candid with this Court.
C.

Chatterton v. Walker is a "Red Herring/1

Before her brief to this Court, Judd relied exclusively on Chatterton v. Walker, 938
P.2d 255 (Utah 1997), to justify the appointment of counsel. Judd stated unequivocally
that "Chatterton v. Walker is the applicable case law and is not distinguishable/1 R. 654.

(granting immunity for furnishing information regarding suspected insurance fraud).
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Chatterton was the exclusive legal basis for the court's order. Id. After promoting
Chatterton as the exclusive basis for the court's authority, Judd now dismisses Chatterton as
a "red herring," "only indirectly referenced by the district court." Judd Br. at 26. The true
"red herring" is Judd's exaggerated effort to transform the reference to "fair play and the
interest of justice" into a justification for the unprecedented appointment of counsel to
represent a defaulting party and compel his adversary to pay for the same. Ultimately, Judd
fails in her effort to distract this Court from the record she created, a record that relies
exclusively on Chatterton. R. 654. The explanation for Judd's effort to distance herself from
Chatterton is a recognition that it is not controlling. TDC's opening brief demonstrated that
Chatterton's is limited to the insurer's obligation to provide counsel to an insured solely in
a negligence case where the insurer intervenes and claims the uninsured party was not liable.
The provision of counsel or reimbursement of expenses should be directly
related to litigation of the issue of the uninsured motorist's negligence and the
damages resulting from that negligence and should not implicate collateral
issues relating to the insurer's intervention.
Chatterton, 938 P.2d at 262. Nothing in Chatterton suggests that the insurer has an
obligation to pay for counsel for the insured in a declaratory action, where the insurer
challenges the existence of coverage. Furthermore, nothing in Chatterton or in any case cited
to the district court empowers the court to appoint counsel for a defaulting party who has not
sought representation and to require the adversary to pay for that representation.
The unfortunate circumstances underlying this action give rise to emotional arguments
to aid Judd, but the simple truth is that there is no justification for expansion of the court's
"inherent authority." Thus, under any standard, the district court's decision was more than
14

a garden variety mistake of law, it was a gross and flagrant abuse of judicial authority.9
D,

The Court Must Address Whether TDC Has a Contractual Obligation to
Pay for Drezga's Representation.

In TDCs opening brief, TDC explained its obligation to defend Drezga extended only
to professional malpractice claims. TDC Br. at 32-33. Absent a separate contractual
obligation, the district court lacked authority to compel TDC to provide Drezga a lawyer in
any other case. Id. The Order that TDC pay for Drezga's defense amounted to an improper
award of attorney fees. Id. at 34-35. Plainly, there is an actual controversy whether TDC
may be compelled to fund its adversary's defense, even though no contract or statute10
requires it. TDC does not seek an "advisory opinion/1 it seeks relief from an improper Order.
Judd writes off these arguments as being raised for the first time on appeal, claiming
that the court never considered the "contractual provisions and proposed interpretations" that
TDC raises. Judd Br. at 31. This is patently false. The Oct. 10 Decision expressly states that
"the appointment of counsel is premised on the sound legal reasons set forth in the Court's
May 22, 2001 decision, and also on defendant Drezga's insurance contract." R. 1428
(emphasis added). Additionally, in the September 26, 2002 hearing, TDC also expressly

9

Judd's attempt to impose a "marshaling requirement" on TDC is specious. The issue is
whether the court has authority to appoint counsel, an issue not based on any factual findings.
The issue is not whether Drezga has adequate representation in the declaratory action. It is
settled that "[challenges to a trial court's legal determinations... do not require an appellant
to marshal the evidence." Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, f 14;
61 P.3d 1009.
10

See, for example, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3, which gives the court discretion in a divorce
proceeding to order one spouse to pay the attorney fees of the other to enable them to
"prosecute or defend the action."
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raised the issue of the court's authority to require TDC to pay for Drezga's representation, and
the court acknowledged that argument:
Rencher: First, Your Honor, the issue of who pays [for Drezga's counsel] is improperly
before the Court. I was advising the Court that that remains to be the problem.
The issue of who pays is a contractual or legal relationship between an
attorney and the insurance company. There will be no contractual
relationship, I think, that can be found. I think there will be no legal
relationship that Utah law recognizes in this instance with adverse parties
that can be found.
* * *

Judge Lewis: So noted.
Ex. B; 25:18-25; 26:1-9. These references to TDCs contractual obligations completely
undermine Judd's argument and credibility.
The issue in Burke's Petition requires the Court to address whether TDC must pay
Drezga's fees: "Whether the district court may appoint counsel to represent an absent
defendant in an action where the defendant's insurer seeks to retroactively invalidate
an insurance policy issued to the defendant/' Burke Br. at 1 (emphasis added). Even if
the Court holds there is "inherent authority" to appoint counsel, that determination does not
resolve the question of whether TDC may be ordered to pay for Drezga's attorney. In
Travelers Indemnity, the Texas Supreme Court held that without any contractual basis, it is
an abuse of discretion warranting extraordinary relief for a court to shift the burden of paying
an indigent claimant's fees to an insurance company because it "radically skews the
procedural dynamics of the case." 923 S.W.2d at 595.
Whatever the extent of the trial court's inherent authority [to appoint counsel],
however, it does not extend to requiring [the insurer] to pay [the attorney's] fees.
There is no indication in the record before us that the trial court could only have
carried out its constitutional function by imposing this fee burden on [the insurer].
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In the absence of such a showing, allowing trial courts to exercise this power
under the guise of "inherent authority" would constitute a judicial end-run around
the statutory fee-shifting scheme. We therefore reject [the claimant's] argument
that the trial court had inherent authority for its actions.
Id. at 594. n As in Travelers Indemnity, nothing in the record supports shifting the burden
of Drezga's defense to TDC. Juddfs personal, but baseless, attacks certainly do not justify the
Order, as is demonstrated in Addendum 1. Furthermore, Judd's hostile comments stand in
stark contrast to the district court's consistent praise of TDC and its counsel. See infra at
Section III(B). TDC demonstrated in its opening brief that there have been no findings, such
as bad faith or stubborn litigiousness, to justify imposing that burden on TDC. See, e.g.,
American States Insur. Co. v. Walker, 486 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1971).
This Court must address the grounds for an Order that TDC pay an outside attorney
to defend Drezga and limit the potentially enormous burden that would necessarily fall on
the shoulders of future litigants. If this Court takes the momentous steps of allowing the
appointment of counsel for a defaulting defendant and requiring the adversary to fund both
sides, then the Court must settle the justifications for such an Order. Plainly, in no case
where the court used its "inherent authority" to appoint counsel, did the district court
successfully pass the costs of litigation on to the litigant's adversary.12
1!

It is not necessary to appoint additional counsel. Without conceding that Judd has standing
in this case, Judd has access to the same information and arguments as would counsel for
the absent Drezga.
12

TDC's opening brief explained why Drezga may prefer not to appear and risk a verdict of
fraud, as opposed to a default judgment, which he may seek to reopen. TDC correctly
challenged the assumption that Drezga necessarily wanted representation absent any
evidence, other than his non-participation. Responding to this argument, Judd resorts to
discredited "myths" about collusion between TDC and Slagle. The lack of any record
17

II.

BURKEf S REPRESENTATION OF DREZGA WOULD VIOLATE THE UTAH
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
A.

Judd's Personal Attacks Against TDC's Counsel are Irrelevant to the
Issue of the Ethical Implications of Appointing Burke.

Instead of getting to the heart of the second issue, whether Burke's acceptance of the
appointment would place him in ethical peril, Judd has chosen first to spend two pages
unloading another series of inappropriate and baseless attacks against TDC and Slagle. Judd
Br. at 37-38. Amidst this barrage of attacks, Judd accuses TDC of an "ethical extreme
makeover." Judd Br. at 38. The "extreme makeover" here is Juddfs treatment of the record.
Judd?s personal attacks are utterly false, as evidenced by the absence of any record
citation to support them. Judd Br. at 37-38. Judd claims TDC "had counsel appear and
represent Dr. Drezga" in the declaratory action, when, in fact, Slagle never represented
Drezga in the declaratory action. R. 1799 at 5:12-13, 6:5-6; Slagle Aff. f 4. Judd questions
TDCs ethics "at having Drezga!s counsel obtain, and then turn over to TDC, federally
protected documents." Judd Br. at 37. As Judd knows, these documents were produced in
response to a lawful Subpoena that Judd never challenged. R. 1799 at 33:19-20; Slagle Aff.
f 13. Judd accuses TDC of arranging for Slagle to appear "side by side" with TDC at the
summary judgment hearing (Judd Br. at 37), when the record is clear that Slagle did not
represent Drezga at that hearing and that it was only at the district court's invitation that

references on page 35 of Juddfs brief demonstrates how far afield Judd has gone in her
mischaracterization of the facts. Moreover, Judd misleadingly cites Utah Code Ann. § 31A22-202 (2004) for the proposition that TDC may not retroactively invalidate Drezgafs
coverage. This statute, as Judd previously conceded at R. 1548, is inapplicable. It applies
only to an agreement between the insurer and the insured to abrogate the insurance contract.
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Slagle participated at all. R. 1799 at 5:8-9; Slagle Aff. f 6. Judd accuses Slagle of
"conveniently step[ping] aside" after TDCs Summary Judgment Motion was denied, when,
in fact, it was only at the district court's urging that counsel initially agreed to accept service
on behalf of Drezga, a representation Slagle thoughtfully retracted because Drezga had not
authorized him to accept service. R.539-540; 1799 at 29:12-15; Slagle Aff. fflf 9-10.
Critically, TDC and Slagle never discussed at any time any cooperation in the declaratory
action and any suggestion of collusion between TDC and Slagle is false. Slagle Aff. f 19.
This fabricated version of the record is inexplicable; Juddfs counsel was at the hearing and
the transcript speaks for itself.
Furthermore, the question of whether Drezga was properly served with the Amended
Complaint or whether acceptance of service was authorized is irrelevant. TDC did not seek
a default on the Amended Complaint. The status of this case is that there has been no
response to the original Complaint. The question of service of the Amended Complaint is
irrelevant. It defies logic why these senseless personal attacks have been made instead of
substantive argument. It is the ethical implication of Burke's acceptance of the district court's
appointment that is before the Court. Judd's attacks on the integrity of TDC, its counsel and
Slagle serve no legitimate purpose.
B.

Drezga Did Not Consent to Representation in the Declaratory Action and
Such Representation Would Violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Although Juddfs personal attacks are meritless, the quality of the argument contained
in the reports of the ethics experts is very high. The experts, Skolnick, Charles A. Gruber
("Gruber"), Gary G. Sackett ("Sackett") and Professor Thomas D. Morgan ("Morgan"), are
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all qualified to opine on the ethical implications of the court's appointment. It is nevertheless
apparent that Judd has done a poor job of advocating for her experts. Judd fails to address
the particular Conduct Rules raised in either Burke's Petition or the Gruber and Skolnick
Affidavits. Instead, Judd refers to the general need for "flexibility" in interpreting mandatory
Conduct Rules, the need for "reasonableness," and the "need of courts to assure the proper
administration of justice." Judd Br. at 39-42. Judd's silence about specific rule violations
is deafening. Judd appeals to "flexibility," but the mandatory nature of several of the
Conduct Rules do not give lawyers discretion in their conduct. R. 1238.13
Judd does not directly refute any of the Conduct Rule violations highlighted in
Skolnick's report. Under Rule 1.2, it is the attorney's obligation to abide by the client's
decisions, an obligation that is impossible to meet when the client is absent and has not
consented to representation. Skolnick also points out that under Rule 1.4, a lawyer must keep
a client informed of the status of the representation, an obligation that cannot be met.
Furthermore, Skolnick refers to Rule 1.14, which compels the attorney, insofar as possible,
to make "adequately considered decisions, although the client's participation may be
impaired." Skolnick makes clear that although Rule 1.14(a) accounts for impairment "for
some other reason," not listed in the rule, nothing in Rule 1.14(a) or the accompanying
comments demonstrates that the rule was intended to apply to non-consensual
relationships with missing clients. Skolnick also addresses the potential liability exposure

13

Both Prof. Morgan and Sackett explicitly assume that the district court had authority to
appoint counsel for the defaulting Drezga and order TDC to pay for it. R.1299; R.1319.
That assumption is wrong and undermines their entire argument.
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an attorney representing an absent client may face from third persons who dealt with a lawyer
in good faith. R. 1144-1145. Judd ignores all of these specific conclusions.
Importantly, Judd fails to address the conclusions in the Gruber Affidavits. Gruber
persuasively demonstrates that the appointment order compels violation of several mandatory
rules. R. 1228-1241. Additionally, Gruber's Reply Affidavit, R. 1377-1389, exposes the
fundamental flaw in the Sackett and Morgan opinions, which Judd never addresses.
Specifically, Gruber notes that because there has never been an attorney-client relationship
between Drezga and counsel, Drezga has never consented to representation or given
implied authority to anyone to retain counsel on his behalf. Gruber concludes that without
this fundamental agreement, no attorney can represent Drezga in this action. R. 1381.14
Gruber carefully demonstrates the difference between Drezga's implied consent to accept
representation in the malpractice action based on the insurance agreement with TDC, and this
case where there is no consent. R.1231-1232;1382. Gruber also specifically addresses the
ethics opinions Sackett claims justify the appointment of counsel. Gruber explained that
where Drezga is completely absent and has expressed no interest in representation, the cases
addressing representation of present clients, such as indigents, have no application. R. 13 84.
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Judd erroneously describes Skolnickfs and Gruberfs criticism of the district court's Order
as relying "on the diminished ability of replacement counsel to consult and communicate with
Drezga." Judd Br. at 40. Judd misses the point, as demonstrated by her repeated references
to "replacement counsel." Gruberfs Reply Affidavit makes clear that it is the complete
absence of any relationship between Drezga and counsel that subjects the appointed attorney
to ethical peril. It is not merely a failure to communicate with Drezga, but more
fundamentally, a failure to obtain Drezga's consent to be represented—regardless of whether
counsel might or might not be able to communicate with Drezga during the litigation.
21

Gruber also distinguishes the opinions of Sackett and Morgan for their failure to cite any
instance in which a party who has absented himself from the jurisdiction is entitled to
counsel. R. 1385. In this connection, Gruber reminded the court that Drezga has no right
to counsel in this civil matter under state or federal Constitutions.
Ultimately, Juddfs experts take solace in the assumption that it is unlikely that the
Office of Professional Conduct would proceed against an attorney accepting the appointment.
This is, of course, pure speculation and a subject over which neither the parties, the experts,
nor the district court has authority. R. 1384-1385. Thus, Juddfs plea for "flexibility" rings
hollow when nothing in the Rules or the ethics opinions permit a lawyer to accept an
appointment to represent a defendant who has disappeared from the jurisdiction, expressed
no interest in the litigation, and never consented to representation. As Gruber thoughtfully
concludes, "why should Drezga be rewarded for his refusal to appear in court to defend the
declaratory action? There appear to be no shortage of people urging this court to appoint
counsel for Dr. Drezga, except Dr. Drezga himself."15
III.

JUDD'S HOSTILE PERSONAL ATTACKS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILITY.
Juddfs brief adopts a tone of hostile indignance toward TDC that is entirely
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The ethical peril to an appointed lawyer is compounded by the practical difficulties of
representing a missing client. For example, how could counsel, in accordance with Rule 11,
affirm or deny the allegations in a complaint without consultation? What is the scope of the
representation? If appointed counsel fails to bring defenses or counterclaims, is that failure
res judicata as to Drezga? Does appointed counsel face a malpractice action for failure to
represent him adequately? The hypothetical nature of the problem is irrelevant: what Drezga
might actually want from counsel has always been the "elephant in the room."
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unjustified.

Juddfs personal attacks against TDC and its counsel rely principally on

misrepresentations of the record. TDC must address these misrepresentations and set the
record straight. It would be unfair to allow those accusations from such well-respected
counsel to go unnoticed or undiscussed. This Court has made clear that misrepresentations
about opposing counsel and the record do not promote the spirit of professionalism necessary
to enhance the reputation of the bar: "Neither written submissions nor oral presentation
should disparage the integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics or personal behavior of an
adversary, unless such matters are directly relevant under controlling substantive law."
Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility at If 3 (emphasis added). Plainly, Judd?s
personal beliefs about TDC or its motives are not relevant to the disposition of this case. Id.
at Tf 4. Juddfs derogatory remarks "have no place in an appellate brief and [are] of no
assistance to this court." Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ^ 62; 56 P.3d 524.
A.

Judd's Pattern of Misrepresentation.

Juddfs damaging distortions stand out as even a cursory reference to the record
reveals. Judd's misrepresentations reach their zenith when she describes Slagle as "the
defense attorney that TDC originally hired and arranged to appear in court and accept service
on Drezga's behalf," Judd Br. at 5, an allegation she repeats at pages 11 and 37. The
suggestion that TDC brought Slagle to the summary judgment hearing to represent Drezga
in the declaratory action is shockingly false. Slagle made clear to the court that he did not
represent anyone in the declaratory action. R. 1799 at 5:14-15; 20:10-13; Slagle Aff. \ 6.
Of course, it was only at the district court's suggestion that Slagle agreed to sit at counsel

23

table and receive service of TDCs Amended Complaint. R.1799 at 5:6-8.
Judd further distorts the record by referring to "replacement counsel" more than 70
times throughout her brief, when in fact, Drezga was never represented in this matter. R.
1799 at 5; Slagle Aff.fflf4 -5, 17. At no time was there ever any improper communication
between TDC and Slagle. Id. at^f 19. Juddfs erroneous description of Slaglefs role goes well
beyond the realm of "spin." Ultimately, Juddfs effort to turn insinuation and implication into
fact renders an enormous disservice to this Court.
B.

The District Court's Complimentary Attitude Toward TDCfs Counsel
Disproves Judd's Baseless Personal Attacks.

Although this litigation has been ongoing for several years, Judd can find absolutely
no support in the record for her personal attacks. See Addendum 1. To the contrary, the
district court has been uniformly complimentary. The district court, who has always been
in the best position to objectively assess TDCs representation, has consistently applauded
TDCs efforts. For example, on September 26,2002, the district court stated "Mr. Rencher,
your representation in this court is professional and, further, I would never question that. I
know you too well." Hearing of September 26, 2002 at 30:22-25, Ex. B. Furthermore, the
Court noted, "your integrity [Mr. Rencher] is not at issue." Id. at 31:7-9.16 At the November
28, 2001 hearing, the district court, addressing Mr. Rencher, stated "I think you are an
advocate, a zealous advocate, a fine lawyer, and you have always treated me with respect."
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At the March 24,2003 Hearing on the appointment of counsel, the district court told TDCs
counsel [Mr. Rencher] that "you have acted with your usual professionalism in this case."
Hearing of March 24, 2003 at 10:21-23, Ex. C.
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Hearing of November 28, 2001 at 22:21-25, attached as Ex. D. Later, in that hearing, the
district court addressed counsel and stated "it's always a pleasure to have you here because
I know the quality of the written product and the oral argument is always going to be high,
so even though I may not have ruled in—to everyone's satisfaction—I always am delighted
to have you all here and appreciate the high quality and professionalism associated with
anything in which you participate." Id. at 22:6-13; see alsoR.1428 (commending exceptional
work product). The district court's comments make clear that although the parties are
engaged in lengthy, difficult litigation, the professionalism of TDC's counsel has never been
absent. In this light, it is apparent that the insinuations of bad conduct that Judd has injected
are unfounded.
CONCLUSION
The Court should revoke the March 8, 2003 Order appointing counsel.

DATED this

$4by

of December, 2004.

EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC

Jaryl L. Rencher
Vaun B. Hall
Attorneys for The Doctors' Company
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Addendum 1

ADDENDUM 1
TDCS RESPONSE TO JUDDyS STATEMENT OF FACTS
Juddf s brief is overflowing with unsupported arguments and inaccurate representations
about the facts of this case. While TDC does not respond to every "fact" represented in
Judd's brief, TDC, in an effort to clarify the record, will address those "facts" that distort the
issues before the Court.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 2
TDC objects to Judd's implicit characterization in Fact No. 2 that TDC had an
obligation to settle Judd's claim prior to TDC exhausting its rights to determine Drezga's
entitlement to insurance coverage. TDC filed the declaratory action to resolve the scope of
its obligations under Drezga's policies. R. 6-7. Judd's characterization of TDC's motives and
intentions is unsupported argument, not fact.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 6
In Judd's Fact No. 6, she incorrectly characterizes the presence of David Slagle
("Slagle"), Drezga's counsel in the underlying malpractice case, at the Motion for Summary
Judgment hearing as an "appearance" by Slagle in this action as counsel for Drezga. In fact,
Slagle did not enter an appearance on behalf of Drezga in this action. See Affidavit of David
Slagle (hereinafter "Slagle Aff") f 4, attached as Exhibit A; R. 1799 at 20:10-13. Rather,
the district court invited Slagle to come forward and sit at counsel table because of his role
in the underlying malpractice case. R. 1799 at 5:14-15. Indeed, as Slagle noted at that
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hearing, "[W]e really are not involved in this case. We are involved in the underlying
action." R. 1799 at 5:14-15; Slagle Aff. 16.
Additionally, Judd mischaracterizes Slaglefs agreement to accept service on behalf of
Drezga in the declaratory action as an entry of appearance. In fact, Slagle plainly noted, "I
am not in this case. I do not represent anyone in this case." R. 1799 at 20:10-11. Slagle's
expressed concern was that the declaratory judgment action needed to be resolved quickly
to determine the scope of his possible representation in the underlying malpractice action.
R. 1799 at 21:15-19. Accordingly, at the district court's urging, Slagle said he was willing
to accept service of TDCs Amended Complaint in the declaratory judgment action but
expressly cautioned that "the only problem is, I don't have permission from my client to
accept service." R. 1799 at 29:6-14; Slagle Aff. f 9 . The district court stated it would then
deal with that later if it became a problem. Id. at 15-18.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 8
Juddfs Fact No. 8 unleashes a profound mischaracterization of the propriety of TDCs
counsel's conduct that permeates Juddfs entire brief. Through not-so-subtle implication, Judd
suggests that Slagle colluded with TDC in providing "federally protected documents"
showing that Drezga committed fraud on his insurance application. In fact, the record is
clear that TDC obtained these documents through a lawful Subpoena served on Slagle,
a copy of which was also served on Juddfs counsel. R. 1799 at 33:19-20; see also Slagle
Aff. HTf 13, 19.
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Furthermore, Juddmisleadingly characterizes TDCs statement that it was "not entitled
to get" those documents on its own. R. 1799 at 32:19. TDC only raised the issue of its
entitlement to the documents during colloquy concerning why TDC had not raised the issue
of Drezga's fraudulent misrepresentations earlier in the litigation, or when TDC first issued
the insurance policy. Id. at 31:15-25, 32:1-22. There was nothing improper or unethical
about TDC obtaining these highly relevant documents from Slagle pursuant to a lawful
Subpoena and any implication of impropriety is misleading and false. Slagle Aff. f 14.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 9
TDC again objects to Judd's characterization in Fact No. 9 concerning the means
through which TDC received documents showing that Drezga lied on his malpractice
insurance application. These documents were not disclosed in a suspect manner, as Judd
implicitly suggests. R. 1799 at 33:19-20; see also Ex. A, Slagle Aff, and Subpoena for
Production of Documents attached to Slagle Aff. as Ex. 1. Indeed, only after TDC obtained
an order from the district court governing their disclosure did TDC make them available for
the district court's in camera review, and the district court expressly noted that TDC "was
correct in not providing [the documents] until he had a court order suggesting that they had
to be provided." R. 1799 at 18:18-22.
Furthermore, there was also no impropriety in Slagle's Affidavit. This Affidavit was
provided under a caption for the underlying malpractice case. R. 48-49; Slagle Aff. If 15.
Moreover, the content of this Affidavit is undisputed and undisputable. It merely recites
Slagle's inability to communicate with Drezga—a fact that Judd never contested or could
3

contest. R. 48-49. TDC never suggested or attempted to discuss with Slagle that he
cooperate with TDC in the declaratory action. Slagle Aff. ^f 19.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 11
In Fact No. 11, Judd misleadingly characterizes Slagle's statement that "Dr. Drezga,
my client, most likely lied on his application for insurance," as an effort to "expedite" a ruling
against Drezga. R. 1799 at 221:13-14; Judd Br. at 11. The statement is taken completely out
of context. Slagle was merely addressing the facts and documents the Court had previously
received in the course of the hearing. R. 1799 at 21:8-19; Slagle Aff. f 16. Slagle made
clear to the Court that to determine whether he should continue his defense of Drezga in the
underlying malpractice action, he would first need a decision from the district court on the
declaratory judgment action. Id. Slagle made these comments before the district court ever
asked him to receive service in the declaratory action. Additionally, Judd ignores that Slagle
also expressly stated that he would not advocate for TDC's position in the declaratory
action:
Mr. Slagle: The fact is, as you look at these documents, that he had three settled
malpractice cases that he did not disclose on his application for
insurance. Whether that's legally sufficient or not to cancel a policy
retroactively, that's up for The Doctors' [Company] to argue. I
certainly wouldn't argue that. But nothing is going to change just
because an amended complaint is filed.
The Court: I see what you're saying.
M a t 22:5-12.

4

RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 12
Once again, in Fact No. 12, Judd negatively mischaracterizes Slagle's so-called
"disclosure" of "federally protected information" to TDC. As established, the documents
showing Drezga committed fraud were produced in response to a lawfully issued Subpoena
and were before the district court for the Court's own inspection. R. 2799 at 33:19-20; Slagle
Aff.f 13.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 15
Judd also misleadingly characterizes the district court's decision denying TDCs
Motion for Summary Judgment in Fact No. 15. The district court never "factually found"
that TDC failed to demonstrate Drezga's lack of cooperation in his malpractice defense.
Rather, the Court decided the issue "as a matter of law." R. 513. Judd also mischaracterizes
the Court's rationale for not retroactively rescinding Drezga's malpractice insurance policy.
The district court never made any finding of the fact that TDCs efforts to rescind were
"motivated by and rose only after learning of the malpractice involving an innocent injured
third party." The Court never imputed any wrongful motive to TDC in its summary judgment
decision (R. 509-516), or at any time in this litigation. In fact, the Court commended all
counsel for their handling of the case. R. 1427-1428. See Section III(B) of TDCs Reply
Brief.
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RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 16
Juddfs mischaracterization of the record is most blatant in Fact No. 16, where Judd
misleadingly describes Slagle as ffthe defense counsel hired and arranged by TDC to
represent Dr. Drezga for purposes of its summary judgment motion." As already
established, Slagle did not represent Drezga for purposes of the summary judgment motion,
explicitly advised the Court of that fact, and never entered an appearance on behalf of Drezga
in the declaratory judgment action. R. 1799 at 5:14-15, 20:10-13; Slagle Aff. ffi[ 4, 5, 6.
Indeed, Judd herself advised the district court that Slagle was only retained "to represent Dr.
Drezga in the underlying [malpractice] action." R. 609. More generally, of course, Judd is
simply wrong in asserting that TDC ever hired counsel to represent Drezga in the declaratory
judgment action.
Additionally, Judd is incorrect that Slagle's refusal to appear on behalf Drezga in the
declaratory judgment action left Drezga "without effective legal representation." Drezga
never had legal representation in this declaratory action. Drezga left himself without
effective legal representation through his avoidance of service of process and failure to
respond to the properly published Summons authorized by the district court and the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 17
Judd again distorts the role of Slagle in this action in Fact No. 17. The refusal of
Slagle to represent Drezga in this action did not leave Drezga "unrepresented" for the simple

6

reason that he was never represented in this action. R. 1799 at 5:12-13, 6:1-6; Slagle Aff.
If 4. According to the Order Judd herself prepared in the underlying malpractice
action, and signed by the Court in that action, "there is reason to believe that the
Defendant [Drezga] is avoiding service of process." R. 941-942 (emphasis added). Thus,
Drezgafs apparent flight to avoid service, as Judd represented to the Court in the underlying
malpractice action, explains why he is unrepresented in this declaratory action.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 18
Juddfs assertion in Fact No. 18, that Slagle "conveniently stepped aside" to enable
TDC to pursue its default judgment motion, is patently incorrect. The only record citation
Judd offers for this assertion comes from Juddfs own brief before the district court, which
does not support the inference of collusion Judd attempts to create. Slagle never acted for
TDCs benefit (R. 1799 at 22:4-12; Slagle Aff. | 19), never represented Drezga in the
declaratory action, and there was never any improper collusion between TDC and Slagle.
R. 1799 at 5:14-15, 20:10-13, 29:12-14; Slagle Aff. 1fi[ 4, 11, 19. Indeed, Slagle never
discussed with TDC the content of the letter refusing to accept service, or his intention to
write such a letter, except to the extent that he advised all parties in open court that he was
not authorized to accept service. R. 1799 at 29:12-14; Slagle Aff. 112.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 20
Judd improperly puts words in the mouth of the district court when she states in Fact
No. 20, that the "district court factually found" that Drezga did not have adequate
representation in this matter, and that Drezga was in an adversarial position with TDC. In
7

fact, in the district court's May 22,2001 Decision, the Court did not set forth any findings of
fact, and Judd's characterization of the district court's conclusions as being "factual," is not
consistent with the Court's opinion. R. 1024-1025.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 21
Judd falsely states that "TDC openly resisted the district court's order to retain
replacement counsel for Drezga." To be sure, TDC sought to stay the district court's order
requiring the appointment of counsel (R. 1119), but seeking this Court's review of a lower
court's decision does not amount to "openly resisting] the district court's order." Such a
characterization falsely impugns TDC's conduct in this action, which the district court has
consistently applauded as maintaining the standards of utmost professionalism. R. 14271428; see Section III(B) of TDC's Reply Brief (citing several examples of the district court's
praise for the professionalism of TDC's representation).
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO. 23
Judd's description of TDC as "defiant" of the district court's order to appoint counsel
is both inappropriate and unsupported by the record. It was not in defiance, but in
compliance with the district court's order to appoint counsel that TDC approached attorney
Michael F. Skolnick ("Skolnick") to represent Drezga in this declaratory action. Skolnick's
March 12,2002 Affidavit expressly states as much: "I was recently contacted by counsel for
The Doctor's Company and requested to inform the Court whether I would accept
representation of Gregory Drezga in this case." R. 1125. Skolnick is a well-respected
attorney in this community, and the unsupported suggestion that he compromised his integrity
8

to enable TDCs "defiance" of the district court is simply stunning and reflects a real lack of
candor with this Court.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 25
TDC objects to Juddfs characterization in Fact No. 25 of TDCs request that the district
court reconsider the appointment of counsel to defend Drezga as the "latest delay." As
evidenced by the district court's certification of the question of the propriety of appointing
counsel to this Court, it strains reason and the record to suggest that seeking clarification of
a novel question of Utah law constituted a mere delay tactic.1

1

Juddfs repeated allegation that TDC has "single-handedly" delayed the litigation is false and
unfair. For the past 20 months, TDC has awaited resolution of Burkefs ethical concerns
regarding his appointment as counsel. Prior to that, between February 2002 and March 2003,
TDC was, in part, trying to comply with the district court's order to appoint counsel, by
contacting attorney Michael Skolnick, who declined to accept the appointment of counsel
because of ethical concerns. R. 1138-1147. Rather than chastise TDC for any delay, the
district court applauded counsel for "the exceptional work product they have produced
in an effort to fully inform this court of the ethical considerations involved in
appointing counsel for defendant Drezga." R. 1427 (emphasis added). Between January
2000 and February 2002, the parties were trying to resolve TDCs Motion for Summary
Judgment and crucial issues concerning the discovery of database records showing that
Drezga committed fraud in his insurance application. The Court also required TDC to amend
its Complaint during this period and there was an almost-eight-month delay arising from the
briefing of the Motion for Summary Judgment and its ultimate denial in October of 2000.
Prior to that, the Court had to resolve Judd's Motion to Appoint Counsel and Judd's own
Motion for Summary Judgment and the attendant briefing required on these pleadings.
Critically, at no time during the litigation of the declaratory action has the district court ever
chastised TDC for delaying the case or being dilatory in its conduct. The Court was
uniformly complimentary of TDCs involvement in this case and never complained, as Judd
does, that TDC was responsible for delaying the litigation. See Reply Brief Section III(B).
9

RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 28
Judd misrepresents the content of Mr. Sacketfs report in Fact No. 28. Sackett never
used the erroneous phrase "replacement counsel" to refer to a lawyer appointed to represent
Drezga. In trying to advance her agenda, Judd is not being candid with the Court and her
repeated use of the term "replacement counsel" more than 70 times is improper.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 35
Judd is wrong in asserting in Fact No. 35 that TDC "flatly refused to comply" with the
district court's order appointing counsel. Juddfs allegation, taken from the order Judd
prepared, takes TDCs statements at the hearing on the appointment issue entirely out of
context. As a courtesy to both the Court and Burke, the attorney appointed to represent
Drezga, TDCs counsel expressed his belief that the issue of payment of fees would have to
be resolved separately from the issue of appointing counsel to represent Drezga. Transcript
of Hearing of March 24,2003 at 5:5-19, attached as Exhibit C.2 TDC noted that under Utah
law, unless there is a "contractual, a statutory or a case law basis," attorneys fees could not
be awarded. Id. Indeed, the Court went on to note, "it seems to me that itfs an expense [the
attorney fees] that ought to be borne equally by both sides." Id. at 6:12-13. Although the
district court ultimately ruled that TDC should pay Burke's fees, TDC has never formally

2

The transcript of the November 28, 2001 hearing (Exhibit D), the September 26, 2002
hearing (Exhibit B), and the March 3, 2003 hearing (Exhibit C) were prepared by Rocky
Dustin, Reporters, Inc., a certified court reporter who attests to their accuracy. Because of
the unanticipated nature of the Judd brief, TDC did not order the transcripts of the
proceedings in accordance with Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TDCs
previously-filed Motion to Supplement the Record.
10

refused to pay appointed counsel as Judd misleadingly states. Rather, TDC has stated a
consistent position that it objects to any such payment and its statement that "I caution the
parties, my opponents here, that [the payment of fees] may be come an issue for future
consideration and those attorneys may be — should be properly advised of that" simply put
the issue on the radar for the district court and the appointed attorney. Hearing of
September 26, 2002 at 26:2-8, attached as Exhibit B.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 36
Once again, Judd wrongly characterizes TDCs effort to obtain a final determination
of the novel question of appointing counsel in this case as "resisting compliance with the
district court's orders." Burke felt compelled to petition for an extraordinary writ and this
Court's willingness to grant TDC the right to brief the questions before the Court evidences
the viability of TDCs concerns with the legal justifications underlying the district court's
order to appoint counsel to represent a defaulting defendant. Judd does not acknowledge the
incredible substantive difference between seeking appellate review and openly defying a
court order.
RESPONSE TO JUDD FACT NO, 38
In Fact No. 38, Judd again refers to Burke's role as "replacement counsel," a
misleading and incorrect description of Burke's role in this litigation. This misleading
characterization appears more than 70 times in Judd's brief. Judd's reference to Burke as
"replacement counsel," suggests that Drezga had representation at one time, but that counsel
"stepped aside" to aid TDC. The record is clear that no appearance was ever entered on
11

Drezga's behalf in this matter. R. 1799 at 5:12-13; Slagle Aff. 1fl[ 4-5, 17. The original
Complaint was properly served on Drezga by publication pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. R. 44-45. This method of service was the same Judd used in the underlying
malpractice action. R. 941-942. This service was based on several affidavits Judd submitted
to the Court in the malpractice action. R. 27-34. Drezga defaulted. He did not file an
answer to TDCf s declaratory action. He has never had representation in this matter. Assigning
the title of "replacement counsel" to the first attorney appointed to that role is a blatant
distortion of the facts in this case.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PAUL C. BURKE,
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AFFIDAVIT
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Case No. 20040500-SC
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990904527
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake
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David Slagle, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am a partner at the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. I am

licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and have been so licensed since 1968.
2.

I was retained by The Doctors' Company to represent defendant, G.

Gregory Drezga, M.D. ("Drezga"), whom The Doctors' Company had insured, in the defense
of a medical malpractice claim made by Heidi Judd personally and as natural parent and

guardian of Athan Montgomery in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, Utah (the "Malpractice Action").
3.

While I was representing Drezga in the Malpractice Action, The

Doctors1 Company separately brought a declaratory judgment action in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County (the "Declaratory Action"), by which it sought a
judicial declaration that it was not obligated to insure Drezga or provide him a defense in the
Malpractice Action.
4.

At no time did I represent either Drezga or The Doctors1 Company in

the Declaratory Action.
5.

Because the Declaratory Action concerned my continued representation

in the Malpractice Action, I attended the hearing held on the summary judgment motion on
June 29, 2000. (Record 1799.) I did not enter an appearance on any person's behalf at that
time.
6.

I have read in the Brief of Real-Party-In Interest, Heidi Judd, that I

"likewise appeared and agreed in open court to accept service on behalf of Dr. Drezga in the
declaratory action so that the hearing on TDCs summary judgment motion could proceed
that day." Judd Brief at 8,^[6. That statement is not accurate. Because I would be affected
by the motion, I attended the hearing, as did the attorney who represented Tooele Valley
Regional Medical Center in the Malpractice Action. We initially did not sit at counsel table
and did so only upon specific invitation from the Court. The transcript of the June 29, 2000
summary judgment hearing makes this clear and makes clear that I was not representing Dr.
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Dregza in that hearing. At Page 5 (R. 1799), the Court invited me to "come forward so in
case you want to pipe into the arguments, you can." I responded "Thank you. We really are
not involved in this case. We are involved in the underlying action." The Court indicated
that it understood but invited me to "listen and be party to that." R. 1799 at 5:14-15.
Thereafter, I made clear to the Court that "I am not in this case. I do not represent anyone in
this case but I need to point out these things to the Court, though, because I am in a position
that is very difficult for me." R. 1799 at 20:10-13.
7.

With regard to the service of the Amended Complaint in the

Declaratory Action, Mr. Rencher sought clarification of the Court's Order granting him the
right to amend the Complaint. Mr. Rencher pointed out that "this is not really something that
needs to be published again. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an Amended Complaint
can be sent by mail to the defendant, after the Complaint has been filed and the defendant
was served." R. 1799 at 28:5-8.
8.

The Court pointed out the difficulty of serving an Amended Complaint

because Drezga had disappeared. In response to counsel's request for an expedited
determination, the Court was interested in "getting the Amended Complaint filed so I can
move forward and make a ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. We'll deal with the
issues of whether he needs to be served again and how later." R. 1799 at 28:18-21.
9.

Thereafter, the Court suggested that I could accept service of process.

After I pointed out that "there has been service effectuated through publication on the
original Complaint" (R. 1799 at 29:9-10), I said that I would be willing to accept service but
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"the only problem is, I donft have permission from client to accept service, but I think legally
that may be sufficient." The Court recognized the difficulty I faced and said "if there is an
objection at some time raised by his client, then we'll have to go through the formality of
handling it in the more time-honored manner." R. 1799 at 29:16-18. My office thereafter
accepted service in accordance with Judge Lewis's suggestion.
10.

After receiving Mr. Rencher's Motion for Clarification of Order

Denying Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 30, 2000,1 felt compelled to clarify
the situation and, in a letter dated November 6, 2000,1 advised Mr. Rencher, Mr. McConkie
and the Court as follows:
I seem to recall that Judge Lewis suggested that your Amended
Complaint could be served on me, as attorney for Dr. Drezga.
As I have thought about it, I see no way that I could accept
service for Dr. Drezga. He has not authorized me to do so. I
have never talked to Dr. Drezga. Although I am representing
him in the case filed by Heidi Judd, which is scheduled to go to
trial on December 4 in Judge Wilkinson's court, I was retained
by the insurance carrier to defend him in that case and am doing
so under a reservation of rights.
I do not believe there is anything in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that allows me to accept service for Dr. Drezga in a
matter where I have not been retained by Dr. Drezga.
R. 539-540.
11.

To the extent that Judd now implies that I colluded with counsel for

. The Doctors' Company and falsely claimed that I represented Drezga "for purposes of
[TDC's] summary judgment motion" (Judd Brief p. 11, f 16), that is not true. I repeatedly
pointed out to the Court at the summary judgment hearing that I did not represent Drezga in
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that hearing, that I was not authorized to accept service of process on his behalf and that I
was not making an appearance in that case. R. 1799 at 5:14-15; 20:10-13; 29:12-14.
12.

I did not discuss with Mr. Rencher, or with any representative of The

Doctors1 Company, the content of my November 6 letter or my intention to write such a
letter, except to the extent that I advised all parties and the Court in open court that I was not
authorized to accept service.
13.

Judd also alleges that I disclosed federally-protected information to Mr.

Rencher, as counsel for TDC. Judd Brief p. 10, ^f 12. Judd fails to point out that I produced
the documents in question in response to a Subpoena TDC caused to be served on me.
Counsel for Judd received a copy of the Subpoena when served. See Exhibit A attached
hereto.
14.

Judd asserts that the documents I produced in response to a lawful

Subpoena "were obtained and passed on to Rencher by none other than the TDC-affiliated
counsel, hired to represent Dr. Drezga." Judd Brief p. 9, % 8. To the extent that this
statement implies that there was some wrongdoing, I would deny that.
15.

The assertion in Paragraph 9 of the Judd Brief, that I disclosed

federally-protected information about my client to Mr. Rencher and signed an Affidavit to
support the summary judgment motion, is similarly misleading and unfair. The Affidavit I
provided was provided under a caption for the Malpractice Action. It merely recites my
undisputed inability to communicate with Dr. Drezga — a fact that Judd never contested or
could. R. 48-49.
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When I addressed the Court regarding Dr Drezga's failure to disclose

prior malpractice actions against him, I was merely addressing the facts and documents the
Court had received in the course of the hearing (R 1799 at 21 8-19) and that the insurance
application did not disclose the three malpractice settlements that were disclosed in the
records the Court had received Id These facts, drawn from documents the Court had before
it, had implications for my continued representation m the Malpractice Action The Court
needed to understand these facts so that I could receive guidance for my continued
representation, if any
17

The assertion m Paragraph 18 of the Judd Brief, that I "conveniently

stepped aside enabling TDCs default motion" and the repeated references to "replacement
counsel" are misleading As I previously pointed out, I never represented Dr Dregza in the
Declaratory Action and made that point clearly and repeatedly I did not "step aside" because
I never entered an appearance on behalf of Dr Drezga I made clear to the Court that I had
no authority to accept service of process of an Amended Complaint The Judd Brief
concedes at Paragraph 17, The Doctors' Company never attempted to obtain default judgment
upon the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint, service of which Judge Lewis
asked me to accept
18

As I pointed out to Judge Lewis, I believe I was m an extremely

difficult situation of trying to represent a client with whom I could not communicate I had
been retained by the insurance company under its authority to retain counsel to defend claims
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against its insured. I believed it important to all sides, including to Judd, to have the question
of whether there was a valid insurance policy determined as early as possible.
19.

Throughout my representation of Dr. Drezga, neither Mr. Rencher nor

any other representative of The Doctors1 Company attempted to influence in any way any
action I took in representing Dr. Drezga. Nor did Mr. Rencher or any other representative of
The Doctors' Company attempt to have me take any action in the Declaratory Action, other
than to fulfill the request Judge Lewis made to me in open court to accept service of the
Amended Complaint. Mr. Rencher never suggested or attempted to discuss with me the
possibility of a default judgment or my role in the same, or that I cooperate with the
Declaratory Action. He never evidenced any desire and did not attempt to obtain federallyprotected information in any fashion not properly provided for by this Court's rules. In short,
the suggestion of any collusion between me and Mr. Rencher is entirely false.
Further Affiant saith naught.
Dated this

^

day of (pj? (C^rx WA

2004.

spJfoj

David Slaw

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9^

day of

/tPjLLsu*UA^\

2004.

i£Jl

^AJ>

My Commission Expires:
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NOTARY PUBLIC
PATRICIA B. BIRCH
10 Exchange Placa
NtwhouM tWQ. 1 tth Floor
Sail U M City, OT M i t l

Jaryl L. Rencher #4903
Scott Wood, #5885
EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Crandall Building Fifth Floor
10 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 983-9800

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE DOCTORS- COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.

)
)
]

G. GREGORY DREZGA, MD; and HEIDI J. ;
JUDD, personally and as the natural parent and;
guardian of ATHEN MONTGOMERY, for
;)
and on behalf of ATHEN MONTGOMERY, ;)
Defendants.

TO:

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
[No appearance required]

Civil No. 990904527
Judge Leslie Lewis

]

David Slagle, Esq., Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, #1100, Salt Lake City,
UT 84111
YOU ARE COMMANDED to produce at the offices of Epperson & Rencher, 500 Crandall

Building, 10 West 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, on or before Friday, the 9* day of June, 2000,
and all records regarding G. Gregory Drezga, M.D. This would include, but not be limited to, the
credidation file, records of any settlement payments, apphcations for insurance with the Doctors Company,

application for privileges at an hospital, and any other document relating to Dr. Drezga's insurance
coverage, applications therefore, or other lawsuits in which he has been involved, whether resolved or not.
All documents produced by outside entities should be produced as well.
DATED this 2-ffi day of May, 2000.
EPPERSON & RENCHER

JARYL L. RENCHER
R. SCOTT WOOD
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the Jj(p

day of May, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Subpoena

Duces Tecum was mailed. U.S. Mail first-class postage prepaid, to the following:

James W. McConkie
Parker, McKeown & McConkie
Attorneys for Defendant Judd and Montgomery
Woodlands Business Center
4001 South 700 East Suite 500
Salt Lake City. UT 84107
David W. Slagle
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Lewis B. Quigley
Hanson, Nelson, Chipman & Quigley
215 South State Street Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

THE DOCTORS COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 990904527
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

v.
TAKEN: September 26, 2002
G. GREGORY DREZGA, MD;
and HEIDI J. JUDD,
personally and as the
natural parent and
guardian of ATHEN
MONTGOMERY, for and on
behalf of ATHEN
MONTGOMERY,

Judge Leslie Lewis

Wr

Defendant.
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Reporters, Inc. 10 Vv'est 100 South, Suite 250 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 7^6-50S0 Dhone (801) 7^6-5083 fax 1-866-31 0-DEPO w/vweportersinc ~et

r£oort§is
inc.

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff

Jaryl Rencher
EPPERSON & RENCHER, P.C.
Crandall Building Fifth Floor
10 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

For the Defendant

Bradley Parker
James W. McConkie
PARKER McCONKIE
4001 South 700 East, #115
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 2002

2 I

3:18

p.m.

P R O C E E D I N G S

JUDGE LEWIS:

We are here in the case of The

Doctors Company vs. Drezga, et. al., it's 990904527.
Mr. Rencher, you're here on behalf of the
plaintiff; is that correct?
MR. RENCHER:

That's correct, The Doctors

JUDGE LEWIS:

And Mr. McConkie and Parker are

Company.

here on behalf of the defendants?
MR. PARKER:
JUDGE LEWIS:
hear the arguments.

That's correct.
Thank you.

And I'm happy to

As I understand it, we are here on

the issue of counsel's appointment; is that correct?
MR. RENCHER

That's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE LEWIS

All right.

MR. RENCHER

Thank you, Your Honor.

Jaryl Rencher on behalf of The Doctors
Company.

We appreciate Your Honor's consideration.

I'm

aware of the Court's order requesting no more than 15
minutes per side and so let me be brief, if I may.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Okay.

MR. RENCHER:

The Court has before it a host

of affidavits on both sides of the issue, an affidavit

ROCKIE E. DUSTIN * CSR, RPR
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1

from Mr. Skolnick, whom my client tried to retain, who

2

believes it would be unethical for counsel to appear for

3

Dr. Drezga.

4

The Court also has an affidavit by Charles

5

Gruber, former —

I think the title was assistant

6

disciplinary counsel for the Utah State Bar, who

7

likewise believed it would be unethical for any counsel

8

to appear without Dr. Drezga's express request or

9

consent.

10

The Court has before it an affidavit from what

11

I understand is the current chair of the ethics advisory

12

panel of the Bar, claiming it would not be unethical.

13

And then an affidavit by -- and I apologize not knowing

14

his name, a professor at BYU f s law school, also

15

concurring in that view.

16

I also filed a response of affidavit by

17

Mr. Gruber.

18

the Montgomerys had proposed, felt strongly enough that

19

he was willing to do a responsive affidavit, and that's

20

before Your Honor.

21

Mr. Gruber, when he saw the affidavits that

The issue, I think, could be decided by Your

22

Honor in weighing those affidavits and concluding where

23

your judgment properly lies.

24

one up and show the other one and try to compare them.

25

And Ifm not going to pull

I want to talk just briefly about the
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1

practicalities of the matter.

2

a conversation with Mr. Gruber, and so I do this with

3

some degree of serious -- with very serious degree of

4

concern, because I bounced this off of Mr. Gruber as to

5

what-ifs.

6

This results in part from

This is the major concern that I see.

If the

7

Court appoints counsel for Dr. Drezga in this case,

8

without Dr. Drezga's knowledge or permission, there are

9

real life hypotheticals that can occur.

Some may be a

10

stretch, some may be not a stretch, but real life

11

hypotheticals can occur that will point out how the

12

ethical issues are triggered.

13

If that counsel were to appear for Dr. Drezga

14

with a notice of appearance, that counsel then has to a

15

make a determination as to, number one, whether they

16

oppose and/or accept service of the amended complaint

17

that I have requested Your Honor again allowing me to

18

serve, which alleges fraud in the contract.

19

Or, two, whether they reject any request by

20

the Montgomerys or others to accept service of that

21

complaint and allow a default to be entered on the

22

nonfraud allegations.

23

One may say, well, why in the world would

24

counsel allow a default to be entered when he could

25

answer the amended complaint and defend on those new
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1

fraud allegations?

The problem is this:

There is

2

substantial evidence before Your Honor in the form of

3

earlier papers filed with motions that a reasonable jury

4

could conclude indicates Dr. Drezga committed fraud on

5

The Doctors Company in the contracting for that

6 I insurance.
This relates back to the old question:
you ever involved in any malpractice litigation?

Were
And we

have cited the Court at least three instances where he
is .
We would, likewise, then go get affidavits
from those insurance companies, bring those witnesses to
trial who will say, "I expect that I sat down with
Dr. Drezga and, of course, he was aware of this
litigation.

He had to consent to the sum."

A jury

could conclude after the evidence that Dr. Drezga
committed fraud.
That attorney for Dr. Drezga has just
committed an ethical violation.

If Dr. Drezga returns

from parts unknown, be it Tibet, where he is studying
with the monks or anywhere else, and wants to practice
law in most -- excuse me, medicine, in most
jurisdictions in this country, he is going to have to
meet professional standards.
Fraud, a finding of fraud, may preclude his
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ability to ever practice medicine again.

And he may say

to that attorney, "Look, I have no assets, I couldn't be
found.

A default I can always come back and explain to

an insurance company that wants to insure me for future
care by saying, Look, I was away.

I didn't know.

I had

no excess exposure, but now I can't practice at all
because you f ve got a finding of fraud against me."
The other problem I see if that counsel
appears without Dr. Drezga's permission is that we will
be back to the question that Your Honor has wrestled
with in a former order, if I may be so —

if I may

clarify it as such.
I have requested a default on a nonamended
complaint.

Your Honor, I think, has acknowledged that

that seems on its face to be inconsistent with Your
Honor's ruling that an insurance company can never
rescind coverage if there is an innocent third party,
but that Your Honor would reconsider that at a later
time after counsel is appointed.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Right.

MR. RENCHER:

The concern I have, Your Honor,

is that default issue will repeatedly arise when I send
a request for admissions and interrogatories.

The rules

do not allow that counsel to answer those
interrogatories and sign off on them.

If they are not
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1

answered, I'm going bring a Rule 37 motion to compel and

2

then I'm going to request sanctions of default for

3 I dismissal.
I'm going to notice up Dr. Drezga's deposition
if that counsel appears.

Dr. Drezga is obviously, I

don't think, going to appear, and I'm going to be back
to the Court requesting sanctions.

Because he is

properly before this jurisdiction, he has an obligation
to appear.
I have not found a case, Your Honor, where our
Supreme Court -- it may be out there, but I apologize, I
haven't found it, where the Supreme Court has forgiven a
party's failure to appear when properly served under the
alternate procedures allowed by our Rules of Civil
Procedure.
We have served him at least twice the way Your
Honor requested us to, once the same way the Montgomerys
did.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Yes.

MR. RENCHER:

And he has failed to appear.

What is the practical outcome of not
appointing counsel?
If Your Honor decides that the call is too
close, that Your Honor's order cannot conceivably
protect counsel, even if that counsel is willing to take
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1

the risk of a finding of unethical conduct, and says it

2

will not appoint -- require the appointment of counsel,

3

the practicalities of that are that we're back to the

4

question, will Your Honor enter a default so that we can

5

appeal the issue?

6

And the Court —

the Supreme Court, that can

7

protect that attorney from an ethical complaint, can

8

say, no, there should be appointment of counsel, and

9

Judge Lewis was correct in her ruling that no rescission

10

will occur, or they may conclude otherwise.

11

immediately get to the -- to the Supreme Court through a

12

default judgment and have those issues resolved.

13
14

But we can

JUDGE LEWIS:

I understand your position on

MR. RENCHER:

If we appoint counsel, on the

that,

15
16

flip side, we have a whole host of other questions that

17

occur.

Who is going to pay for that counsel?

18

JUDGE LEWIS:

Yes, and I'm not sure.

Perhaps

19

a better thing would be to now hear from the other side

20

and then have you respond.

21

MR. RENCHER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

22

JUDGE LEWIS:

Mr. Parker.

23

MR. PARKER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

24

bit of a cough and I'll -- I hope that doesn f t

25

interfere.

ROCKIE E. DUSTIN * CSR, RPR
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1

Brad Parker appearing for the Montgomerys in

2 I this case.
JUDGE LEWIS:
MR. PARKER:

Okay.
Let me just respond initially to

two or three assertions by Mr. Rencher in this case.
Mr. Rencher is concerned about the case
proceeding forward and there being an adverse finding
against Drezga of fraud.

And he assumes in his argument

that if Drezga has defaulted, that there will be no
adverse finding and that that might somehow be of
benefit to him.
Well, I don ! t think that part is

JUDGE LEWIS:

true, and I didn't actually hear Mr. Rencher say that.
Perhaps I misunderstood.

I think a default would be

would be an avenue for responding.

I think

Mr. Rencher's position is just that it might be easier
to deal with it in the future than a finding on the
fact.
MR. PARKER:

Well, and my point is, I believe

there's going to be a finding on the facts anyway,
because the Court has recognized the Montgomerys as a
party -JUDGE LEWIS:
MR. PARKER:
forward in this case.

Yes.
-- and is allowing us to go
And so there's going to be a
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1

trial that relates to coverage and relates to whether

2

there was fraud or not, and there's going to be official

3

findings of the Court or of a jury.

4
5

JUDGE LEWIS:

Why should I appoint counsel,

Counsel?

6

MR. PARKER:

Well, for the same reason that

7

Your Honor appointed counsel in the first place, and

8

that is -- and the same reason it's been done in Utah

9

and recognized by the Supreme Court.

And that is, that

10

after a claim is made, when the client is not to be

11

found, the insurance company has placed the client in a

12

precarious situation by taking advantage of that and

13

saying, "There's no client, he can't be represented,

14

let's deny coverage."

15

And additionally, the insurance company is in

16

a position, as Your Honor initially found, a superior

17

position, they have accepted premiums all along the way.

18

They have counsel and now they're expecting an insured

19

to hire counsel who usually is not as well situated to

20

do that in defense.

21
22
23

JUDGE LEWIS:

Right.

I understand what you're

saying.
MR. PARKER:

And we did not —

Your Honor, we

24

haven't been addressing the issue of whether counsel

25

should be appointed or not.
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1

already decided that.

The issue that we have looked at

2

is whether the fact that Drezga is absent -- and I T m

3

just referring to your letter of June 12th, whether the

4 I fact that he is absent makes it unethical for an
attorney to represent him.
I think we've already visited the "should
counsel be appointed" four different times.

And so the

question really here isn't should counsel be appointed
or should counsel not be appointed.
JUDGE LEWIS:

What do we do now, given that we

have no counsel?
MR. PARKER:

The question is:

Is there an

ethical problem so that counsel really can't work?

And

let me address that issue.
JUDGE LEWIS:
MR. PARKER:

Okay.
First of all, I would say that

neither I nor Mr. McConkie have seen this respondent's
affidavit by Mr. Gruber.

I don't know how that

happened, but I went through and pulled every pleading
we had in the file and -JUDGE LEWIS:

That's not right.

Do you have an extra copy of that,
Mr. Rencher?
MR. RENCHER:

I'll be happy to give him one,

Your Honor.
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JUDGE LEWIS:

I appreciate it, and we'll make

some extra copies before everyone leaves.
MR. PARKER:

I think we can respond anyway.

The question in this case is a question of
interpretation of the ethical rules.

And those ethical

rules we would urge, Your Honor, need to be interpreted
in context, because if they're not, they seem to be
conflicting.

The rules on the one hand require that a

lawyer abide by a client's decision, that the lawyer
consult with the client, that the lawyer abide by a
client's decision concerning settlement, that the lawyer
keep the client reasonably informed.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Right.

MR. PARKER:

And the affidavit by Mr. Gruber

indicated that there is a clear violation there.
JUDGE LEWIS:

But none of that was likely to

occur, or had occurred.
MR. PARKER:

Right, but none of that had

occurred or could occur.
On the other hand, there is Rule 1.4 -- or
1.14 that indicates that the client's ability to make an
informed decision and the lawyer's responsibility can be
affected by minority, by disability, or for some other
reason.

And that rule is made to help apply these other

rules in context, supply them in a real life situation.

L
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And indeed, that's exactly what has happened
in this case.
court case.

Dr. Drezga did not appear in the trial

He didn't consult with Mr. Slagle in

settlement negotiations, he didn't consent in any way to
Mr. Slaegle's defense.

There is no signed agreement

allowing Mr. Slagle to represent him.
There is a small provision in the policy that
says that TEC can represent —

or can defend

Dr. Drezga's interests, but it doesn't actually say that
they can then hire an attorney and it doesn't say who
the attorney is.
Now, we're not claiming that David Slagle was
unethical, but David Slagle ran afoul of the same
problems that we're claiming here and that is, he
couldn't consult.

He was paid by someone other than the

client.
JUDGE LEWIS:

How are things any different

this time?
MR. PARKER:
different.

They're not going to be

He is going to have the same type of

representation, legal representation, that he had with
David Slagle.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, then put a lawyer down, if

I appoint one, in an untenable position.
MR. PARKER:

Well, was David Slagle an

•Qnrjcrv P
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1

untenable position?

No.

David Slagle was in a position

2

where I believe clearly, under the rules, he's allowed

3

to step in and represent Drezga, because Drezga -- he

4

couldn't meet these other portions of the rules because

5

not of minority, not of disability, not of death, but

6 I for some other reason.
JUDGE LEWIS:
8 I

MR. PARKER:

9 I reason?

There is a catch-all.
And what was that some other

That some other reason was his absence.

And

that catch-all, I believe, is a catch-all that helps us
here .
The -- in the affidavits that were filed with
the Court, I think there were several telling things.
TEC once said, "Look, let's wait and get an
ethical opinion from the Bar."
Gary Sacket, who was the chairman of the
committee that issues those opinions, said, "Well, no,
an ethical opinion can't be rendered because we never
render opinions on cases that are presently sitting in
the Court."

But he said, "If we did render an opinion,

then" -- and he's the one that has chaired this, I
think, for 10 years.
JUDGE LEWIS:
MR. PARKER:
call.

For a very long time.
He said, "This isn't even a close

It's not even a close call.
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within the rules and there would be no ethical
violation."
JUDGE LEWIS:

I think that's helpful.

MR. PARKER:

Dr. Morgan, who doesn't teach at

BYU, and we gave Your Honor his affidavit, but was the
distinguished professor at Emery, Dean of the Emery Law
School, he visited at BYU for a year, and is the author
of the National

Textbook

on Ethics.

says, "This isn't a violation.

He comes in and

The appointment isn't an

ethical violation."
JUDGE LEWIS:
MR. PARKER:
JUDGE LEWIS:

Well -And so —
—

I'll be candid with you, I'm

inclined to appoint counsel, but you can continue to
comment.
MR. PARKER:

Okay.

Well, I learned early on,

Your Honor, when the Court is inclined to rule in one's
favor, sometimes one just does damage by speaking.
JUDGE LEWIS:
Mr. Parker.

Let me ask you a question,

How would you handle the issue of who that

attorney is and how payment is to be made?

Because I

think Mr. Rencher has raised two very important
practical considerations in his arguments.
MR. PARKER:

Let me address that.

One on -- one of the issues raised by
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1

Mr. Rencher is that, well, my goodness, we shouldn't be

2

able to recommend counsel because we're in an adverse

3

position to Drezga and that should really be TEC' s --

4

JUDGE LEWIS:

I would say it should be a

5

situation where, kind of akin to a divorce case, where

6

each side can submit four names and then I make a

7

selection.

8
9

What about that?
MR. PARKER:

We would be happy to do it that

way.

10

JUDGE LEWIS:

11

MR. PARKER:

Who pays?
Let me just say one thing.

We

12

would say that in the present case, our interests are

13

aligned with Drezga.

14

have a multirnillion dollar judgment against him because

15

there's no insurance.

16

It's not in Drezga's interest to

JUDGE LEWIS:

I understand, but the bottom

17

line is that I would rather have -- I'd like to have

18

Mr. Rencher make some suggestions and you make some

19

suggestions.

20

best qualified attorney is to prevail him, not who

21

recommended the attorneys.

22
23
24
25

And what I'll look at is who I think the

MR. PARKER:

We would be happy to do that,

Your Honor.
On the question of who pays, I believe
actually that's also an easy question, Your Honor.
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an insurance company hires a defense counsel, that
defense counsel is to represent a client, not the
insurance company.

And sometimes the client's interests

are not the same interests as the insurance company.
JUDGE LEWIS:
MR. PARKER:

Right.
So when Mr. Slagle is appointed,

it might be in the client's interest to try and come in
and settle the claim, it might be in the client's
interest to do that early, but it is not especially in
the insurance company's interest.

And so there's a

friction there because the insurance company, which
would hope to avoid the claim, may be in a posit
position to the defense counsel who doesn't represent
the insurance company, but represents the doctor.
That same situation exists here.

And as the

Court found previously in the Provo case, and I believe
cited it in Your Honor's decision, and I can cite to
that if you wish, there are cases in which the Supreme
Court has said when somebody pays their premium, they
believe they have coverage.

And it's not a defendant

who is contesting whether that coverage is there, it's
the insurance company, after claim is- made, that's
contesting.

Then it's appropriate to have the insurance

company pay.
We would say, additionally, it's appropriate
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1

here because this case goes on for two years before TEC

2

ever steps in and says, "Oh, just kidding.

3

really not coverage."
JUDGE LEWIS:

4
5

There's

I understand your position on

that.
MR. PARKER:

So we would submit it on that,

Your Honor.
JUDGE LEWIS:

All right.

Mr. Rencher, youfre entitled to the last word.
MR. RENCHER:

I understand Your Honor has

indicated her preference for ruling.

If I may make a

record.
JUDGE LEWIS:
my inclination.

Of course.

And I J ust indicated

You can say anything you wish, and you

could always dissuade me.
MR. RENCHER:

Well, one would hop e that the

right word would surface to do that r Your H onor-, but let
me make a proffer on several points
JUDGE LEWIS:

All right.

MR. RENCHER:

Number one, I would not agree

that counsel could submit two names over my obj ection.
There may be a whole ho st of reasons.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Who would you su ggest?

MR. RENCHER:

Not the least of which is that

counseil proposed a name of a former part ner of mine.
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1

JUDGE LEWIS:

Who would you suggest?

2

MR. RENCHER:

I would suggest Michael

3

Skolnick, Your Honor, and that's whom I did suggest,

4
5

JUDGE LEWIS:

What's wrong with Mr. Skolnick?

Mr. Skolnick said he wouldn't do it.
MR. RENCHER:

He said he thought it was

JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, Mr. Skolnick has a right

unethical.

to say no.

I'm not going to compel any person who has a

law degree to represent someone when they don't want to.
Do you have another name or two in mind?
MR. RENCHER:

I will certainly consider them

and submit them, Your Honor, but my concern is that I
should, if this is the way the court wants to proceed,
have a right to object to any names that counsel has
proposed.
JUDGE LEWIS:
to object.

Well, I guess you have the right

If you have some names handy I might just

pick somebody today that you suggested, but I understand
I'm catching you off guard, as it were.

Mr. Skolnick is

not going to be compelled to represent in this case.

Do

you have anyone else that comes to mind?
MR. RENCHER:

I would be happy to submit those

names, Your Honor, but this is really a decision for my
client to make, not a decision for me to make.
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JUDGE LEWIS:
decision to make.

I'm not sure it's your client's

What does your client know about

counsel, Mr. Rencher?

You're very well versed in that.

I assume your client would turn to you and say, "What do
you think?

Who do you think would be good?"
MR. RENCHER:

I would be happy to submit those

names, Your Honor, but I really don't know -JUDGE LEWIS:

Is it basically that you are

going to object to anyone that the other side proposes?
MR. RENCHER:

No, Your Honor, but there are

certain attorneys that obviously have prior
relationships with insurance companies generally that
makes that untenable.
JUDGE LEWIS:

I want you to make a record, but

before we do, do you have three names in mind,
Mr. Parker and Mr. McConkie?
MR. PARKER:
Mr. Glauser.

Well, one name, obviously, is

I think his relationship --

JUDGE LEWIS:
MR. PARKER:
years ago.

Rick Glauser?
I think his relationship was 10

It doesn't have anything to do with this

case.
JUDGE LEWIS:

What's wrong with Rick Glauser?

MR. RENCHER:

I believe that my client would

want to raise a conflict.

vnrvrr
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1

mine, Your Honor, and I don't think that --

2
3

JUDGE LEWIS:
with these parties?

4
5

MR. RENCHER:

JUDGE LEWIS:

MR. RENCHER:
know that offhand.

10
11

Did he ever do any work for The

Doctors Company?

8
9

We did represent The Doctors

Company when we were --

6
7

Did he ever have any interaction

Well, Your Honor, I wouldn't

I apologize.

JUDGE LEWIS:

Okay.

the names that's tendered.

12

MR. PARKER:

We —

Rick Glauser is one of

Is there another name?
actually, we suggested some

13

other names at one time, Your Honor, and I think we

14

suggested Paul Burke at Ray, Quinney & Nebeker.

15

JUDGE LEWIS:

What about Paul Burke?

16

MR. RENCHER:

I will have to investigate that,

17

Your Honor.

18
19

JUDGE LEWIS:

Do you have any names?

Not at

this point?

20
21

I do not know Mr. Burke.

MR. RENCHER:

I would like to have an

opportunity to consult with my client.

22

You do, but Ifd like to get some

JUDGE LEWIS:

23

idea —

if we have a meeting of the minds today, that

24

would make it a lot simpler.

25

delay.
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1
2

Any other names, Mr. McConkie, Mr. Parker?
Give me one more.

3
4

MR. PARKER:

We have submitted Danny Berman as

a name, Your Honor.

5

JUDGE LEWIS:

Any problems with Mr. Berman?

6

MR. RENCHER:

Again, Your Honor, I would need

7

to advise my client

8
9

—

JUDGE LEWIS:

Okay.

Advise your client that

three names have been proposed to the Court.

The Court

10

is familiar with Mr. Glauser and Mr. Berman and they are

11

outstanding lawyers.

12

have no reason to oppose an appointment of any of the

13

attorneys, but you also have the right to tender three

14

names.

15

I don't know Mr. Burke.

But I

And all other things being equal, unless you

16

have failed to tender a name, I will try to pick someone

17

on your list, but I'm going to give both sides an

18

opportunity within a week of hearing the names, and you

19

just heard them, so you have a week to object, to object

20

to the names offered.

21

I'm going to wonder about how credible it is.

22

it would then sound like whoever they suggest you're

23

opposed to just on principle.

24
25

And if you object to all three,

MR. RENCHER:

I mean,

Your Honor, I know those two

other attorneys and I know them to be honorable men.
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wouldn't surely object in a frivolous manner.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, I know you wouldn't object

in a frivolous manner, but if they suggested three names
and you object to all three -MR. RENCHER:

I haven't suggested that, Your

Honor, and I would take your statement advisory -JUDGE LEWIS:

All right.

Would you like say

anything else on the record?
MR. RENCHER:

I would, Your Honor.

request a clarification?

May I

By when must I tender the

three names?
JUDGE LEWIS:
you wanted.

I was going to give you the time

How much time do you need?

MR. RENCHER:
have 10 days that

Your Honor, I think if I could

—

JUDGE LEWIS:
weeks.

Ten days?

I'll give you two

Two weeks from today seems very fair.

Ten days,

that doesn't give you perhaps as much time as you need.
That would be October 10th.

And then one of the sides

has until October 17th to object.

In the meantime, you

have until October 3rd to determine whether you object
to their people.
If by chance one of the three names they have
given is not objectionable to you, and it says so in
writing, that would obviate the necessity for you to

vnrvrj?
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1

tender any names, but you certainly have that right.

2

MR. RENCHER:

Well, Your Honor, I may not

3

object to all of those names, but I would like the Court

4

to consider nonetheless the names of Dr. -JUDGE LEWIS:

That's fine.

I'd be happy to do

MR. RENCHER:

Because there are obviously

that.

individuals that have more experience working with
insurance companies as retained counsel than others, and
I would like to have that considered.
JUDGE LEWIS:

That may be, but certainly,

Mr. Berman and Mr. Glauser have a wealth of experience.
I don't know Mr. Burke.
MR. RENCHER:

If I may, Your Honor, may I make

a proffer?
JUDGE LEWIS:

Of course.

You may say anything

you wish to me.
MR. RENCHER:

First, Your Honor, the issue of

who pays is improperly before the Court.

I was advising

the Court that that remains to be the problem.

The

issue of who pays is a contractual or legal relationship
between an attorney and the insurance company.

There

will be no contractual relationship, I think, that can
be found.

I think there will be no legal relationship

that Utah law recognizes in this instance with adverse

JinrKTF.
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1

parties that can be found.

2

That should be -- if that is to become a

3

dispute, it will be a dispute between The Doctors

4

Company and their attorney.

5

representation as to how they will handle that, but I

6

caution the parties, my opponents here, that that may

7

become an issue for future consideration and those

I'm not here to make a

attorneys may be -- should be properly advised of that.
JUDGE LEWIS:

So noted.

MR. RENCHER:

The other issue, Your Honor, is

that I apologize to my colleagues for apparently some
mishap as to why they didn't get this reply affidavit,
but it shows it f s been filed.

And Mr. Gruber very

eloquently and clearly distinguishes between the Slagle
situation and this situation.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, if you say it's been

filed, then I certainly accept your representation.

If

you want to hand that to my clerk at this point, we can
save a little time.

Have her make two copies, one for

the Court file and one for the other side.
MR. PARKER:

This shows a filing stamp, Your

Honor, of August 2nd".
JUDGE LEWIS:

I've already told you I

MR. RENCHER:

August 30th of '02.

believe --

PnCKTF.
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1

JUDGE LEWIS:

We will make some cop ies .

2

MR, RENCHER:

I would ask that the Court

3

consid<Br Mr. Gruber's reply affi davit aft er counsel has

4

had an opportunity --

5

JUDGE LEWIS:

Did you give us that , too?

6

MR. RENCHER:

That is the reply affidavit,

7

Your Honor, that counsel indicated he did not receive.

8

But it shows a filing stamp of August 30th, I believe.

9

But he very eloquently and effectively

10

distinguishes what I think is clearly distinguishable in

11

the situation with Mr. Slagle and this situation.
The situation with Mr. Slagle hinges upon an

12
13

insurance contract, an agreement between Dr. Drezga and

14

the insurance company that was made at arm's length when

15

there was no pending adversarial relationship.

16

will see, if you consider Mr. Gruber's reply affidavit,

17

that that's an entirely different situation than this

18

one.

19

And you

And the second response issue, Your Honor, is

20

that the ethical issue is one that's ultimately going to

21

need to be decided by those who govern the ethical

22

practice of lawyers.

23

JUDGE LEWIS:

I think we have that, don't we?

24

MR. RENCHER:

I think, Your Honor, that the

25

Supreme Court is the gatekeeper or the --

-DnniSTT?

T?
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JUDGE LEWIS:

I think ultimately the Supreme

Court will look at the issue, but in the interim, I
think counsel has done everything they can to get an
opinion.

And we have two as I understand, one from an

eminent professor and one from —

albeit an informal

one, from someone who sat on that committee.
MR. RENCHER:

And you have an opinion from two

other members of the Bar, one who disciplined counsel,
Your Honor, who indicates that it is unethical.

And

Mr. Sacket or the professor's statements to the contrary
are not going to govern whether the OPC decides to
prosecute in any given situation.

So I guess there is a

real dilemma here before the Court.
JUDGE LEWIS:

All right.

Fair enough.

MR. RENCHER:

The difference between the cases

that Mr. Parker addressed, or generally the hypothetical
and this one, is that here you do not know that
Dr. Drezga wants counsel.

That's a marked difference

from the situation where counsel appears either in
indigent capacity or in any other capacity.
JUDGE LEWIS:
Drezga.

We don't know anything about Dr.

We don't know whether he wants counsel, but we

know it's in his best interest, don't we?
MR. RENCHER:

No, we do not, Your Honor.

JUDGE LEWIS:

I see.

PnrKTF.
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1

interest to be represented?

2

MR. RENCHER:

I don't think it is, Your Honor,

3

because the problem relating to that is that he may

4

rather have a default judgment based upon no knowledge

5

of the action versus a judgment based upon the fact --

6

JUDGE LEWIS:

You're assuming a judgment is

7

going to enter into, and I think that's an assumption

8

that one cannot make at this juncture.

9

that somebody would be happy with a default judgment.

10

And I cannot say

It seems to me that the whole reason we're all

11

in this business, that is, we all have law degrees, is

12

based upon the precept that someone who is represented

13

is more likely to get a fair trial, wouldn't you say, or

14

a fair adjudication of the issues?

15

MR. RENCHER:

I certainly agree with the

16

proposition that everyone ought have an attorney or two

17

on their speed dial list, Your Honor.

18

however --

19

JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, I don't have it on my

20

speed dial list.

21

Excuse me, Mr. Rencher, go ahead.

22

The difference,

Maybe I'd better make that correction,

MR. RENCHER:

The difference here, Your Honor

23

is that there is a grave problem that arises when you

24

appoint counsel.

25

If my memory serves me correctly, and it's
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been some timef when the issue was raised previously,
the Court concluded that it would order this counsel to
accept service or answer that in the complaint.

That

triggers the problem for which Dr. Drezga may not wish
to have counsel.
JUDGE LEWIS:
determination.

I understand, and I have made a

I'm going to take this under advisement

and give it some more thought.

And I don ft know whether

you're right or wrong, but you've raised some very
interesting points and I want to consider them.
However, the fact that I'm taking this under advisement
and I may rule either way, I haven't made a decision,

,

should not obviate counsel objecting to the three names
that have been given an d filed with their own names,
because I can't be sure on that opinion within the next
two weeks.
MR. RENCHER:

If I may, Your Honor, let me

reiterate, I think I have appeared before the Court
before, I would not all ow, nor would I be party to an
attempt by my client to just say, "Well, any name they
raise is inappropriate. ti
Mr. Rencher, your representation

JUDGE LEWIS:

in this Court is professional and, further*, I would
never question that.

I know you too well.

MR. RENCHER:

n/-i/-.1^Tr' v

And I hope that Your Honor knows
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that I trust Your Honor's judgment in the appointment of
counsel that I may not know.
JUDGE LEWIS:

I just meant that sometimes

there is a perception that an attorney has that, as you
pointed out, that you think you're in a better position,
a more neutral position, if you will, to select counsel
than the other side.

If I sounded like I was saying

something else, I misspoke, because your integrity is
not at issue.
MR. RENCHER:

I frankly believe Your Honor is

in the best objective position and I trust Your Honor's
judgement.
JUDGE LEWIS:

That's why I suggested the names

be tendered to me from both sides and that I just make a
determination based upon who I think would do a good job
regardless of who submitted the names, who you would
suggest.
MR. RENCHER:

I will ask for this

consideration, for a colleague to be named, if that's
Your Honor's decision.
JUDGE LEWIS:

What do you mean, "for a

colleague"?
MR. RENCHER:

If Your Honor decides that there

will be an appointment of counsel and chooses from the
names that are submitted, I would ask for this

nz-v^rr^TP r*
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consideration:

That that counsel be given an

opportunity to consider these five affidavits, because I
think knowingly they come into this with an
understanding of the other side
JUDGE LEWIS:

—

I'm not sure we will ever get an

attorney if I give an attorney a choice.

I think this

is a situation where Ifm happy to provide an attorney
with all five opinions, so he or she does not run afoul
of any ethical duties that they might have, but I would
be ordering an attorney to be on board.
MR. RENCHER:

I understand.

I just would like

eyes open, Your Honor, as to the affidavits.
JUDGE LEWIS:

I will, as to the affidavits.

MR. RENCHER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

JUDGE LEWIS:

Thank you, Mr. Rencher.

MR. PARKER:
JUDGE LEWIS:
Mr. McConkie.

Thanks, Your Honor.
Thank you, Mr. Parker and

We're in recess.

(Whereupon the Proceeding Concluded.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(Klectronically recorded on January 31, 2003)
THE COURT:

Let me indicate that we are hare this

morning in connection with Doctor's Company vs. Dresga, et al,
95>QQ045?.7.

It looks like Mr. Parker and Mr. McConkie ara here

on behalf of tha defendant and Mr* Rencher is her© on behalf of
the plaintiff.
MR. RANCHER:
THK COURT:

Tired of my presence, your Honor.
I bog your pardon?

MR. RKNCHERi

Tired of my presence.

THE COURTi
gentleman.

Okay,

Wall, I'll be honcat with you,

I thought we had the matter resolved.

MR. RENCHER;
THE COURT:

As did I, your Honor.
So what is the difficulty here?

MR. MCCGNKIK:
THE COURT:

I think, your Honor--

Mr. McConkio?

MR. MCCONKIE:

Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Rancher has

hci.m in t r i a l —
THE COURT:

Could I get you to stand at tho podium?

MR. MCCONKIE:
THE COURT:

Sure.

You know with this video equipment it's

hard to g^t a picture or a voice.
MR. MCCONKIE:

Okay, thank you.

Mr, Rencher

Admittedly has been in trial, although I've been

working with

hir uSLiicteint, and we thought wa had an order put together

-3v/hich wo both could agree on.
•Lho bonz

I didn't get it, so I thought

thing to do wac to try ftnd clarify the situation with

thu Court because —

to expedite matters.

THE COURT;

Okay.

MK. MCCONKIE;

Basically this is what wc proposed, and

.I'll lot: Mr, Tienchor speak to whatever position he would like
lo cako this morning.
My understanding when I was speaking with vaun is that
thora would not be a sharp objection to appointing Paul Burke,
who works over at Rfty, Quinncy and Nebeker.
THE C0UXT;

Right, I had understood that initially as

Wtfll.
MR. MCCOHKIE:

If that's still the cacc then that's

Luttled and w# can put that into an order.
TIIJG COURT:

Lot TOO stop you then now.

Mr. Rencher, do

you hnv*. nn objection to Mr. Burke?
MK. RENCHEK;

Your Honor, the Doctor's Company

r.ittiT)tains its objection to the appointment of any Counsel.
They recognize the Court has so ordered it, and that can be
rci'lrctod in the Court's order.

What I had inquired about is

thnt when w£ vftro last here, your Honor, I believe, indicated
that whomever would be appointed would be given the opportunity
to ix*v\

tho briefing as to the ethical issues on both sides,

Wttnt'rd to contact Mr. Burke without it being objectionable to
nuika hliM cvware~~

I

-4
tfHJE COURT:

I would suggest that the more appropriate

Urvy to handle it would b& to send him a letter•

Both sides may

fc'Wl him a letter and then you're to cc ons another so that
neilthor one of you is ever accused of doing or saying something
yovi didn't do or say.
Yau each will have an opportunity to write a letter,
but 3fitme ask you the question we started with.

Are you

closed to Mr. Burke?
MR. RF'NCHER;

In our paperwork, your Honor, we

ftoknowJudge to the Court that wo did not know whether Mr. Burke
hid had experience representing doctors in licensing lawsuits-—
THE COURT:

I don't know whether ha has or not, but

h^'s a good 3&wyer, and more importantly, he'3 willing to do it
and was very gracious about it.

So do you or do you not havo

an objection?
MR, RENCHER:

Wo have an objection to any Counsel

being Appointed—
THE COURT:

You've already said that, and now having

noted that and respecting that and making sure that that
aj-.p^ra in the order, now you know that I'm going to appoint
coinrrjnes, do you have any objection against Mr. Burke?
MR- RJENCHJfclRj

I have no basis known to mo upon which

tn objnot to Mr. Burke.
TUB COURT:
MR. RENCH7:R:

Is that a nor you don't object?
I don't havo a basis to object, your

-5fJonor, except for

what I've already mads a record of.

So no, I

wouldn't object to Mr. Burke, given your Honor's rulings,
1 I

THE COURT:

d I

MR, RKNCHE'R:

5

Okay.
There is an issue that remains to bo

brictc-d,

6

THE COURT:

All right, and that is?

7

MR. REKCHl^Rj

Well, Mr. McConkie and I have informally

fj

discussed that someone should adviso Mr. Burke that he should

3

not rely upon the Doctor's Company to pay his fee.

10

THE COURT:

I do n o t —

Wall, he raised the iscuo with my clerk.

11

Obviously I've had no contact with him about how he is to be

12

paid.

13

Uaw iu ho to be paid?
MU. RENCHER:

Well, your Honor, as we believe, this

14

ought to be a matter that'g briefed to the Cour't and isn't

ID

proaontly before the Court, but that the Supramo Court is clear

16

that unless there's a contractual, a statutory or a caco law

17

bftcLs, you cannot impose attorney's fees, and there in no

IB

contractual, statutory or wo believo case law basis to force

19

thci Doctor's Company to pay fees.

?0

THE COURT;

So in other words, you don't really want

21

an attomoy appointed.

22

Appointed you don't know that you have any reason to object to

?3

Mr. $utko, but you don't want to pay.

21
J$

Mil, PJENCHER:
voluntarily--

You're clear on that.

Well, I —

If one is

if he wants to appear

-6
THE COURT:

Wall, what kind of fool would ho be if he

did that?
I agree,

MR. RENCHER:
THE COURT*

your Honor.

He is a vory gracious gentleman„

My cl^rk

has indicated he has been extremoly cooperative because we've?
cal,lod and said, "Wo, they don't want you*
you.

Mo, thr-y don't want you."

It's been

Yes, they do want
ridiculous, quite

fr<>/ikly.
Ho has raised the issue about f&es.

Ha said he'll do

wh^tover is required/ but I'm not going to bring in a lawyer
f\ncl not provido for him to be paid or her to be paid,
thttt'n wrong*

It seems

I think

to me that it's an expense that ought

to bo borne equally by both sides.
Do you want to speak to T:hat, Mr. McConkifc?
MR. MCCOMKIE:
incue, your Honor.

I think we've actually briefed this

In the case that the Court reliod upon to

appoint Counsel in the first place, the Court appointed
Counsel, and my recollection is that they also paid the
attorney*

It just went —
THE COURT:

it was just —

went hand in glovo.

That was my understanding as woll,

MR. MCCONKIE:

So I don't know that it would bo fair

to divide that burden when tho situation is as it is today, a
prison who hay been insured by their company and is now in an
advuvae position to PBC.

Wo would just simply ask the Court to

follow the precedent in that case, have thorn pay, and then move

-7
forward.
Our concern is the time, und Mr. Renchor has of course
gono up to rho Supreme Court and back and it's taken time, but
ho'n car thinly had an opportunity to contest all of theso
isuuo$.
THE COURT:

I think he's mado his position clear,

which I apprcxeiacn.

Mr, Rancher is always very able in terms

of; sotting forth what his concerns are, which is helpful to me,
I am going to go ahead and appoint Counsel.

X'm going to

Appoint Mr. Burke and he is to be paid in the manner you
suggest.
MH, MCCONKIE:
THE COURT:
orJnr.

All right, thank you.

Now I ask you, Mr. McConkie, prepare the

In the body of it if you would please reflect that

Mr, Rcucher is opposed to the appointment of Counsel in general
and has articulately spoken to this issue, but that as to
Mr. mirk* himself/ there is no specific objection, correct?
MH. RftNCHERi

Yes, your Honor, but I do have a problem

if I iTKiy make a record.
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR, RENCHftR:

I believe the Doctor's Company will

rofuoo to pay his fee.c, and that's —
THE COURT:

Why?

MR, RENCiJKR:

— t h e subject of what should be "a

i;r.*parat'e action between Mr. Burke and the Doctor's Company.

-8
Th&y have no legal basis to pay the fees-

So if we arc going

Co go forward with an order without briefing on that issue,
thffl I U'sod sora© directioni
TUB COURT;

Wf*ll, hare' s what we'll d o —

MIL &ENCHEJI:

If the Court is going to hold him in

fi I contempt and dismiss tho c a c e —
THE COURT*. I'm not.

7

you know, I'm not a judge who

0

l.ikG5 to hold people in contempt routinely.

,9

out other ways of resolving things.

I try ro figure

Here is my suggestion.

10

Wo'11 go forward as I've indicated, and you may file an

11

objection or a request for hoaring and Mr. McConkio can

12

r^^pondr and I will look at it again,

}3

At this point I'm interested in getting the ball

14

rolling, and so my ruling today is baced upon that,

13

if fesM are paid and I later look at the briefing and find that

IC

that was an improper ruling on my part, I'll wake sure that

17

Lhoy'*o repaid from some other source,

18
ID

MR. RI£NCHKH: tfour Honor may recall that I volunteered
this information long before it became an issue-

20

TH1-; COUHT:

21

MTU REttCHER:

22
?3

However,

You volunteered what information?
That the Doctor's Company may rofuse to

pay foe.**.
THE COURT:

I'm woll aware that they'll bo paying the

24

foo3, and I'm not going to hold them in contempt, I'm just

25

^oirig to order them to pay the fees.

-9
MR. KEMCHER:

Thoy havo indicated they will not pay

tho loer,, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well/ they haven't hoard that I'vo

ordorcd, have they?
Mil, RENCH.RR:
TH£ COURT:

Thoy have hoard that —
If that'3 tho case then you better talk to

your client about Court orders, and toll them that thero is a
possibility that I will revisit tho issue and make a different
ruling.

Hut right now thoy're going no pay them.
As I ndid, I don't want to hold anyone in contempt,

X'vo m/ver had to in a Dotting like this.

I would suspect that

if you tell thrift they have to pay the fees based upon a valid
Court order they'll pay them.
MR. KENCHKRs

I don't think so, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Why is that?

You have no control over

your clin-ut?
MR. RENCHER:
your Honor.

I have spoken to their corporate legal,

Thoy refuse to pay the fees.

So I will tell thero

your Honor has ordered it, but it will bring this back h e r o —
IDE COURT:

You know what, w« are on like the fifth or

sixth volume in this case.

It'5 ridiculous.

It coems to me

clva wa'va gotten to tho point where Counsel can't agree on the
oojor of tho sky, and I am tired of it, and I am interested in
moving this ensra along,

I'm noc blaming one side or the other,

but 1 have issued an order that I would like to sign today or

-10tomonow.
If your client fails to comply I guess you're right/
contempt sanctions will bo in ordor/ but I would hopo that you
would havt* come control over your clients, or that the person
who heads up their legal department/ who I assume is a lawyer,
would understand that when a Court order is in effect it means
co bo tjubjfect to compliance.
If that does not occur it's not going to look very
good to mo in terror. o£ the, plaintiff's actions, number one.
Number two, I'll order thorn to pay it and th&y will pay it.

If

chat requires/ as you've pointed out, which s$eras ridiculous,
contempt sanctions, so ho it,
MR. RENCHEH:
THE COURT:
ordrtra from you.

Thoy ought to be taking their marching

You'r© their attorney*

MR. Rli'NCIIER:
position.

I understand your Honor's position.

Your Honor, I understand your Honor's

I think it also ought to be acknowledged that lrir\

tho ore who voluntarily so advised the Court and Counsel.

I

have not been playing a (inaudible),
THE COUKT:

I'm well uwara you've advised them

advisod ua, Mr. Renchor-

You've acted with your usual

piofcssionalism in this case*
told us or not.

—

The problem is not whether you

The problem is I need to know what's going to

happen on funding, end so does this attorney.
Mr. Burkfl is not doing pro bono work hero, and so what

-11i

I'm tailing you is toll your client that if they don't pay

2

l-hcy'ro goincf to bo held in contempt.

3

MR. RTHMCnER:

4

THE COURT;

I will, your Honor.
I would have liked to put it more

5

dr-ljeatcly, but apparently that's what's required because every

6

thno I say to you, "Please urge them to pay," you're saying

7

they'll not going to pay.

8

ilcparlw^nt noeda to como into court when you file your

9

objection-

Well, maybe the chiof of the legal

In tho meantime tho foes better be paid*

10

Wlif.'A h o corner into c o u r t t e l l h i m t o b r i n g a

11

tooihbxu^h, as they say, because if a court order has no impact

12

on people, they don't respect: the law, I have great trouble

13

with that.

34

MK. RENCHER:

As do I, your Honor, but as your Honor

\b

3JL*

J6

tho advice pro or con of their legal Counsel.

17

Honor.--

IS

dWt\t(j, t h e r e a r e o c c a s i o n s w h a n c l i e n t s d o n ' t a l w a y s f o l l o w

THE COURT:

I respect your

On the other hand, I think you are a very

39

persuasive advocate, and an intelligent man who carefully

?0

communicates what'? important,

?1

ftankly, if you do nor havo far more control ovpr your clients

22

than you muy think because I think you're very compelling when

<'J

one- lutons to you-

?4
?D

MR. RENCHER:

I would be very surprised,

I just think someone needs to advise

Mr. P/urko that at some point in the g a m e —

-12TIJE COURT: Mr. Burk© is well aware of it, Ha raised
the icouf.^

He said, "I will do whatever you want, your Honor,"

kind of the. phrase I like to hear, not putting up a bunch of
impediment.
Michelle.

\lo didn't say it directly to me, h© said it to

Just so we're clear, I didn't talk to him-

He said,

"Tell the Judge I'm willing to do whatever she wants me to do.
I am concerned about whether I'll be paid," to which Michelle
said, "We don't know what the source of the payment will be,
bun yon will be paid."
MR- RKNCHER:

That's where it stands.
What I'm suggesting, your Honor, is

Mr. imrke needs to be aware that there may be a point in time
if my client pays the fees where his firm will have to remit
nil of thoaa fees back.
THE COURT.' Didn't you hear what I just said?
MR. RENCHER:

I did, your Honor,

TOE COURT: That Mr» Burke is aware of the problem,
that I have assured Mr, Burke that someone will be paying for
th/i fees, that while we have told him, "No, we don't need you,
Yos, wo need you. No, we don't need you.

Yes, wo need you,"

that *it this point in time we'll call him again and tell him we
do need him.
1 think quite frankly, the fees for Mr. Burke and the
tot??* in general in this case are going to be about ten times
what thoy need to bo becauso Counsel can't seem to agree on
anything, and I think it's time to start agreeing on somo of

-13thr^ri simple matters MR. KENCHEft:

X don't think it's Counsel, your Honor,

I think it's tho party a n d —
THE! COURT:

Wall, hopefully Counsel has control over

the* rcliontc.
MR. p.ENCHER:

Mr. McConkie and I get along famously,

and c o r t r i j n l y —
THIS COURT:

T h a t ' s what I assume.

MR. RKNCHER:
difoiliti^r*.

—X

have the. utmost respect for his

I don't rhink there's any problem i n —

THE COOKT:

There's a great deal of respect in this

crisn that the Court has for Counsel and that Counsel has for
one cinothor, and I'm not in any way suggesting, Mr. Rencher,
rhat you are tho problem or that Mr. McConkie is the problem.
hXl

I'm saying is a lot of paperwork has gone back and

ioith, and I would like from this point forward for you to do
what you can to exercise a little bit more control over your
cliotxt.
MR, RENCHER:

I'll advise thorn of your Honor's ruling.

MR. MCCONKIE:

Thank you, your Honor.

order over to you today.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. McConkie..

(Hearing concluded)

We'll have an
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P R O C E E D I N G S

3 |

JUDGE LEWIS:

Gentlemen, this seemed

4 | appropriate to hear in chambers.

It f s quite a

5 I complicated motion, although Ifm happy to hear anything
6

both sides have to say.

7

We are here in the matter of Doctors Company

8

vs. Drezga, Judd, et al., it f s 990904537.

9

reviewed the pleadings, in fact many of them have been
We f ve had to reschedule the

10

pending for some time.

11

hearing.

12

before me in essence for a very long time.

13

And I have

So I?m cognizant of this issue, which has been

And it is obviously the plaintiff's motion to

14

stay the appointment of counsel for Dr. Drezga.

15

had an order for appointment, an order to appoint signed

16

in August, I believe August 9th of this year.

17

hear from whoever wishes to speak to the issue,

18

Mr. Rencher?

19

MR. RENCHER:

20

on behalf of The Doctors Company.

21

Court considering this this morning.

22

And we

So let me

Yes, Your Honor, Jaryl Rencher
I appreciate the

The most recent order that I'm aware of that

23

the Court has signed relative to this issue is an

24

October 3rd order based upon a stipulation, signed by

25

parties 1 counsel, extending this requirement for

1

appointment of counsel until December 31st, if the Court

2

denies my motion today, or 30 days from the date the

3

Court might deny it, should that be the Court's

4 I determination.

6 1
7

JUDGE LEWIS:

That's fine.

MR. RENCHER:

And I appreciate plaintiff's

counsels' cooperation as the Court's schedule has

8 I necessitated some extensions on this.

10 I

JUDGE LEWIS:

As do I.

MR. RENCHER:

The key issue here —

let me

11

suggest, Your Honor, what the key issue is not and then

12

what the key issue is with my client's motion.

13

The key issue is not should the Court consider

14

this stay based upon the likelihood of the Supreme Court

15

granting a Rule 65(b) extraordinary writ.

16

has been suggested by the defense as part of their

17

opposition, that's a consideration for the appellate

18

court.

While that

19

JUDGE LEWIS:

Uh-huh.

20

MR. RENCHER:

I would think that if the

21

defendants' argument is sound, that is, hypothetically,

22

that this is not a 65 -- does not merit a 65(b) writ,

23

the appellate court will quickly so find.

24

request that as the Court consider this, it not factor

25

in, is this a case that merits appeal at this juncture?

So I would

4

1

The issue, as I see it, and as my client

2

proposes it, Your Honor, is does -- do the issues

3

surrounding the Court's discretion to grant a stay, to

4

allow an appellate court to consider Your Honor's

5

rulings, outweigh the defense's suggestion that there

6

ought to be immediate appointment of counsel pursuant to

7

the Court's order, and a continuation of this case?

8

And these are the things that The Doctors

9

Company would like Your Honor to consider:

First and

10

foremost, Your Honor, there are four decisions that the

11

Court has made which impact upon this motion to say,

12

The first is that the Court must -- The Doctors Company

13

must retain counsel for Dr. Drezga who is not here.

14

JUDGE LEWIS:

Not here today.

15

MR. RENCHER:

The second is that the Court has

16

to date refused to grant default judgment on

17

Dr. Drezga's nonappearance in the action based upon the

18

first complaint.

19

The third issue is that, at least currently,

20

The Doctors Company has been denied its request to

21

republish the amended complaints in order to seek

22

follow-up default judgment, and the Court has indicated

23

that would be reconsidered if counsel is appointed.

24
25

JUDGE LEWIS:

Right.

And that's the very

essence.

5

MR. RENCHER:

And the fourth issue is that

2 I the -- I think the dispositive one, perhaps, for this
3

case, is that no insurance company has a right to

4

rescind coverage if there is an injured third party.

5
6

JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, we're not really getting

to that issue today, as I understand it.

We're dealing

7 I with a much more limited issue.
MR. RENCHER:

I agree, Your Honor, but it does

impact upon the motion for this reason:

If the Court

denies the stay and counsel is ordered to appear,
because there is no intervention from an appellate
court, that counsel for Dr. Drezga, retained by The
Doctors Company, will either choose not to answer the
complaint or will choose to answer the complaint.

Let

me show you why those four issues are relevant to this
stay -- the stay decision.
There are legitimate reasons that I can
foresee as defense counsel in many, many cases for a
doctor, including doctors who are unable to answer on
their own behalf, where retained defense counsel for
Dr. Drezga may refuse to answer the complaint.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Why?

MR. RENCHER:

For example, Your Honor, in this

case, if Dr. Drezga does not answer, and a default
judgment is ultimately awarded, there have been no

6

1

findings by a jury or by the Court, necessarily, that

2

Dr. Drezga has committed fraud-

3

JUDGE LEWIS:

4

board.

5

file.

6
7
8
9
10

If, however --

That's why I want counsel on

That's why I'm going to ask that he enter the

MR. RENCHER:

And my concern, Your Honor, is

that there is a legitimate reason for -JUDGE LEWIS:

I think you're anticipating

something that's not your call.
MR. RENCHER:

But -- I realize that, Your

11

Honor, but I'm using this for illustrative purposes to

12

show why a notion to stay is appropriate.

13
14
15

JUDGE LEWIS:

Essentially, you had a stay.

I

mean, this has been pending for months.
MR. RENCHER:

Well, I recognize that, Your

16

Honor, except that we did not know when the Court first

17

postponed the originally set hearing that we would have

18

this length of time.

19

JUDGE LEWIS:

As you pointed out in the

20

stipulation and order that was signed on or about

21

October 3rd, certainly made it clear to you that you had

22

an amount of time in which --

23

MR. RENCHER:

At least until December 31st.

24

JUDGE LEWIS:

Right.

25

MR. RENCHER:

As the Court is aware,

however --

3 I

JUDGE LEWIS:

That's another month.

MR. RENCHER:

-~ the appellate rules require

4

that we first seek leave from this Court before we seek

5

leave from an appellate court.

6

this Court, aside from those rules, dictates that we

7

request that Your Honor consider the additional stay so

8

that this can be properly briefed.

9

I think our respect for

The point I was trying make, to go back to the

10

issue, is if counsel makes what I think is a fair

11

argument for why an answer should not be filed, of those

12

four issues, three of them are --

13

JUDGE LEWIS:

14

should not be filed?

15

side.

Make the argument that they
That would be up to the other

16

MR. RENCHER:

Right.

17

JUDGE LEWIS:

If you're hypothesizing or

18

guessing as to what they're going to do, how can you do

19

that?

20

and see what occurred?

21

something that I don't think we can fairly anticipate.

22

It's not your job or mine, Mr. Rencher.

23

see it, is to give Dr. Drezga an opportunity to do what

24

he wishes to do through counsel, with counsel's

25

assistance.

I mean, don't we need to go through the process
We're trying to anticipate

My job, as I

8

1

MR. RENCHER:

What I'm suggesting, Your Honor,

2

I'm not asking to you make any ruling on whether counsel

3

is going to be forced to make an answer.

4

trying --

5

JUDGE LEWIS:

What I'm

I'm not ruling on that.

I'm

6

just ruling on the issue of whether or not counsel

7

should be appointed.

8

guess what I am understanding, Mr. Rencher, is how does

9

that hurt you?

10

MR. RENCHER:

We should move forward.

And I

Let me suggest, Your Honor, that

11

regardless of whether The Doctors Company is granted a

12

stay -- if the Court says no stay, of those four key

13

issues, three of them will be unresolved, whether an

14

answer is filed and an answer is not filed.

15

JUDGE LEWIS:

And it has to be done

16

incrementally.

17

happen if we do the following, until we resolve all of

18

them today and skip that one.

19

We can't say this is what we guess will

MR. RENCHER:

No, my suggestion, Your Honor,

20

to use this analysis, is to show you that a stay -- the

21

benefits of the stay outweigh the detriments to a stay.

22

The benefit of a stay is that we will know in

23

short order whether the Supreme Court will grant a

24

petition for extraordinary relief.

25

has been a minimal delay to this underlying —

If they don't, there
to this

9

1

issue and these —

2

outweighed and dispositive.

3

that are ultimately going to be

JUDGE LEWIS:

But if I'm representing the

4

defendant, that seems to me to impede the equity of the

5

process.

6 1

MR. RENCHER:

I'm not sure how that would on

appeal, Your Honor, but my suggestion is that the
prejudice to the plaintiffs in this, The Doctors
Company, outweigh any prejudice to the defense.
JUDGE LEWIS:
later time.

You have asked me to appeal at a

Once counsel is on board, you can still

make the same motion.

You can still take whatever steps

you deem appropriate and approach me again, but this is
a step that seems to me must occur before you can do
that.
MR. RENCHER:

Well, the difference is, Your

Honor, that the prejudice starts once The Doctors
Company is forced to retain counsel -- once they retain
counsel.
JUDGE LEWIS:

How?

MR. RENCHER:

There are extraordinary fees

that are going to take place for that attorney who is
retained to represent Dr. Drezga.
JUDGE LEWIS:

The costs of litigation.

MR. RENCHER:

I acknowledge that, Your Honor,

10

1

but when you weigh that against the fact that the

2

underlying malpractice case, which has gone to a

3

judgment, is already on appeal --

4

JUDGE LEWIS:

I understand.

5

MR. RENCHER:

—

and the interest is already

6

accruing, there isn't any greater likelihood that that

7

appeal is going to be dismissed tomorrow so that that

8

amount can be collectable.

9

some deference to the fact that there are extraordinary

And the -- we should give

10

costs involved to The Doctors Company if they f re

11

required to retain counsel.

12

JUDGE LEWIS:

Ifve considered that.

I've also

13

considered the other aspects of this matter.

14

is not the primary thing I've considered, but in

15

fairness to all the parties, cost is one minor component

16

of that.

17

MR. RENCHER:

The cost

I recognize that, Your Honor.

18

The Doctors Company suggests, however, that in light of

19

the Court's ruling, which imposes upon them a potential,

20

and not in just this case, but in every policy they

21

have, evaluating whether they're going to underwrite the

22

policy, whether they had to do additional investigation

23

on the policy because of the ruling in this case.

24

is not just a cost issue, that's an insurability issue

25

from any other positions.

That

11

1

JUDGE LEWIS:

I don't view it that way.

2

just view it as a matter of equity that all parties

3

need.

4

MR. RENCHER:

I

And I respect the Court's

5

ruling.

I would suggest again that The Doctors Company

6

is in a position where they're being required to retain

7

counsel for someone who has not requested it, who is in

8

default to this Court, or in a position of default, and

9

where this Court often does not require a party to pay

10

for a defaulting party's counsel when there is no

11

insurance involved.

12

judgments every day where there hasn't been

13

I assume the Court grants default

JUDGE LEWIS:

—

Certainly, but I also look at

14

the equities in determining whether or not people with

15

representation would be taking difference actions.

16

I believe they have the right to —

17

situation where representation would be helpful.

18

this appears to be a

And I don't think it interferes with any of

19

your remedies whatsoever.

20

reimbursement on the fees or whatever you deem

21

appropriate at a later time.

22

fees that you're arguing prejudices you?

23

And

MR. RENCHER:

I suppose you could seek

Is there anything besides

Yes, Your Honor, and that was

24

the argument that I made about the impact of this

25

Court's ruling on other policies, on the way The Doctors

1

Company does business

—

2

JUDGE LEWIS:

I guess I don f t see that.

3

MR. RENCHER:

-- for other insurance --

4

JUDGE LEWIS:

I see this as being a ruling
i

5

limited to this case and the facts of this case.

6

MR. RENCHER:

I see no prejudice to the Judds

7

that result from the fact that they already have a case

8

pending on appeal.

9

JUDGE LEWIS:

Ifm not talking about the Judds.

10

MR. RENCHER:

And I see -- I realize the Court

11

is trying to protect an absent party, but that party has

12

chosen not to respond --

13

JUDGE LEWIS:

Do you know that?

14

MR. RENCHER:

-- to publication that has

15

occurred over seven weeks for —

16

Doctors Company, and three or four weeks on behalf the

17

Judds.

18
19

on behalf of The

The presumption is, in allowing service by
publication, that that puts him on notice.

20

JUDGE LEWIS:

I understand your position.

21

MR. RENCHER:

And our argument is he has

22

chosen, while being put on adequate notice, not to

23

respond.

24

there's going to be a significant prejudice in allowing

25

the Supreme Court the brief period of time which they

And The Doctors Company doesn!t believe that

13

1

will take to determine whether this is a petition they

2

believe has any merit.

3

JUDGE LEWIS:

4

—

What if they kick it back for

appointment of counsel?

5
6

If they don't

MR. RENCHER:

We've lost, I assume, at most a

few months.

7 I

JUDGE LEWIS:

Which we don't have to lose if

we take that step and then you follow through on other
remedies you have got.
MR. RENCHER:

I don't see how they're

prejudiced, how anyone is prejudiced by a few months,
Your Honor, because -JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, aside from --

MR. RENCHER:

The party that's going to take

the financial potential out of this case is already on
appeal.

The Doctors Company is prejudiced if they're

not given those three months, because we may be going -litigating for another year on this case before we have
our Rule 4 automatic right to appeal, at which time we
have -And again, I realize it's a financial issue,
but we have fees and costs that are never reimbursable
by a defendant who has either secreted himself or has
forever left the jurisdiction or fallen off the face of
the earth.

There's no way.

14

1

JUDGE LEWIS:

Do you have any reason to

2

believe that that f s happened with Dr. Drezga, that he

3

has fallen off the face of the earth, has secreted

4 I himself?
MR. RENCHER:

The Judds filed a motion before

6 I the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, which Judge Wilkinson
7

said —

8

it basically said there had been reasonable efforts to

9

locate him and he may be avoiding service of process.

10

I cannot paraphrase it verbatim, Your Honor, but

JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, even if that were

11

precisely what the order says, and I haven't read it and

12

I'm not discounting what you say, but that's not the

13

same as offering someone the right to counsel and then

14

seeing shakes out.

15

I mean, what it basically means is you assume

16

all people read papers like the Salt Lake Commercial

17

Record to see if they're being sued.

18

think that's a reasonable assumption.

19

what the law provides.

20
21

I'm well aware of

Anything else, Mr. Rencher, that you want to
call to my attention?

22

MR. RENCHER:

23

Your Honor.

24

you.

25

And I just don't

You'll have the last word.
I'll wait for that last word,

I understand the Court's position.

MR. PARKER:

Thank

Your Honor, Brad Parker appearing

here for the Judds in this case.
2 I

We obviously oppose the motion.

I hadn't

3

prepared to address the issue of the default and the

4

publication and the insured's right to rescind.

5

those have all been briefed and discussed in the other

6

motions.

7

preparation, although I believe I can still speak to

8

those if I need to, but to the pending motion --

9
10
11

I think

And so I really have just limited my

JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, actually, that's all I'm

dealing with today.
MR. PARKER:

We would urge, of course, Your

12

Honor should deny the motion.

I believe we explained in

13

a fairly straightforward manner in our brief, but we

14

believe the motion should be denied for two reasons.

15

One, that there is very little chance, we

16

believe, of this matter being considered on appeal.

17

does not -- the plaintiff has forfeited the right for

18

interlocutory review, didn't ask for that within the

19

appropriate time, the 20-day period.

20

It

The Rule 65 (b) review is only available by

21

statute if there is no other remedy.

And indeed, the

22

Tyler case, which the plaintiff cites, refers to a case

23

in which there was another remedy, the interlocutory

24

appeal, that the party let run and then came in and

25

tried for a 65-day and the Court said, "No.

You had

16

1

another remedy.

You chose not to avail yourself of it.

2

And you can't come in after you've let statutes run,

3 J time periods run, and come in and say now we think we
4
5

want to do a 65(b) appeal."
And so the other remedies are available, but

6

they've been allowed to lapse.

7

that I don't believe they can get over.

8
9

That's one requirement

And the second requirement, additionally, is
that the only ground is for abuse of judicial

10

discretion.

11

this is not the type of judicial discretion that is

12

reviewable.

13

time in domestic cases.

14

And our reading of the case law is, is that

Courts require parties to pay fees all the

It's probably the easiest analogy, where

15

parties, during the pendency of the action, husbands are

16

ordered to pay fees, or wives are ordered to pay fees,

17

and you don't stop the whole thing and send it up and

18

down on appeal on issues like this, only to have it

19

appealed at a later date.

20

type of judicial discretion that is appealable.

21

And we don't feel this is the

Our second reason for opposing the motion is

22

we do think that this matter is prejudicial both to

23

Drezga, who we don't represent, but also to the Judds.

24

We represent a young boy who is in school who is in need

25

of assistance.

The appeal that is up on appeal is an

appeal dealing with the cap, essentially.
an amount lower than the cap
JUDGE LEWIS:
MR. PARKER:

But there is

—

That has been adjudicated.
-- that isn't in question.

There

is no question about the validity of the judgment up to
the cap and of the special damages.

The cap is just

general damages.
And so to put this matter off where I think

—

I think Your Honor's initial ruling was in May, and now
we're six months later -JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, that's in large part the

Court's foul up because of scheduling conflicts.
Nevertheless, you're correct in your timing.
MR. PARKER:

But if it takes three months, and

in my experience it would take longer, to run this
matter up and down through the appellate court, this is
the type of thing that can be again straightened out.
The loss of appeal, when there is an final order, is not
terminated in this matter and we will oppose it for
those reasons.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Mr. McConkie, would you like to

add anything?
MR. McCONKIE:

No, Your Honor.

JUDGE LEWIS:

Mr. Rencher?

MR. RENCHER:

A clarification perhaps is in

18

1

order, Your Honor.

I wasn't requesting that the Court

2 I to reconsider --

4 I

JUDGE LEWIS:

I understand that.

MR. RENCHER:

-- or argue against it's

5

previous ruling.

6

stay is not going to remove those appealable issue.

7

My suggestion was that denying the

JUDGE LEWIS:

I understand.

MR. RENCHER:

That clearly addresses and

refutes any suggestion by the Judds of prejudice.

Their

guess is that if the stay is not granted and we proceed
with counsel and we go through this process, that
somehow those amounts below the cap are going to be
paid.

They're not.

It's still going to take a full

appeal after this court is fully finished with the
litigation.
JUDGE LEWIS:

Well, not if the litigation is

MR. RENCHER:

But that's as much guessing --

JUDGE LEWIS:

That's always an option.

reached.

MR. PARKER:
MR. RENCHER:

Not if Drezga is located.
That's as much guessing as

suggesting that Dr. Drezga's retained counsel may choose
not to answer the question.
JUDGE LEWIS:

I'm not into guessing.

I'm into

making rulings based upon what I perceive the law is and

1

1

anything that happens,

2

MR. RENCHER:

3

plaintiff's presentation of prejudice is guesswork.

4
5

Secondly, Your Honor, whether or not this is
appropriate --

6
7

JUDGE LEWIS:

You say the plaintiff's

presentation?

8
9

And my suggestion is the

MR. RENCHER:

Of guesswork is pure -- of

prejudice is pure guesswork.

How could denying the stay

10

speed up their chance for payment of all amounts that

11

are not being considered on appeal in the underlying

12

malpractice action, absent a settlement?

13

guessing that it will precipitate a settlement, because

14

absent that settlement, this case will be long and drawn

15

out and still require these four issues to be addressed

16

on appeal.

17

JUDGE LEWIS:

They're

You're presuming, though, when

18

you say that, Mr. Rencher, that the appellate process is

19

going to be more expeditious, and that's one of the

20

places where I think your argument is flawed.

21

talking about a month or two, given how long it

22

typically takes them to get to matters, in heavy case

23

law, etcetera.

24

and by the time they give it back to counsel we have

25

lost seven months, eight months, something like that.

We're not

I think we're talking about six months

20

1

MR. RENCHER:

My view is, Your Honor, I don't

2

see the prejudice because we would still have to have

3

those issues resolved.

4

JUDGE LEWIS:

Right.

MR. RENCHER:

And I appreciate the Court's

5

Well, I understand your

position.

6
7

consideration.

8

that if the Court denies the stay, that it leave its

9

current order in place as stipulated by the parties.

10

We'll submit it, Your Honor, and request

JUDGE LEWIS:

All right.

The motion is

11

denied.

The current order remains in place as to the

12

timing.

My objective is not to prejudice anyone, but

13

rather to try to take into account all sides' equity.

14

And for that reason, your point about the additional

15

time, as set forth in the stipulation, seems

16

appropriate.

17
18

So that will be ordered.

I appreciate the high quality of the written
briefing in this matter and the oral argument.

It's not

19 I that I didn't hear it, I did, but I took full
20

opportunity to read everything before I heard argument

21

today, and then I have listened to argument as well.

22

And this seems to me to be the appropriate step at this

23

juncture and I don't think it prejudices anybody's basic

24

rights.

25

And so that would be the order.
Mr. Parker, may I ask you and Mr. McConkie to

21

prepare an order commensurate with what I've just said?
MR. PARKER:

We will, Your Honor.

JUDGE LEWIS:

And taking into account the

stipulated order and the time set forth in there.
MR. PARKER:

We will.

JUDGE LEWIS:

Let me say one more thing.

It's

always a pleasure to have you here because I know the
quality of the written product and the oral argument is
always going to be high.

So even though I may not have

ruled in -- to everyone's satisfaction, I always am
delighted to have you all here and appreciate the high
quality and professionalism associated with anything in
which you participate.
MR. RENCHER:
MR. PARKER:
MR. RENCHER:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you, Your Honor.
May I respond, Your Honor, just

briefly, with opposing counsel here, that we respect the
Court.

It's always difficult when you're pursuing the

stays with an obvious appeal pending, the suggestion
being that there needs to be reconsideration.
JUDGE LEWIS:
Mr. Rencher.

I don't take it that way,

I think you are an advocate, a zealous

advocate, a fine lawyer, and you have always treated me
with respect, and I do not view this as in any way
denigrating that.

I think it's an appropriate motion to

22

make.

It's a well-taken motion.

I'm just not granting

it.
(Whereupon the Proceedings Concluded.)
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Harry Wade, Office of the Attorney General of Texas,
Dan Morales, A.G., Austin, Tx.
For JUDGE: Mayfield, Honorable Alan M., Judge, 74th
District Court, Waco, TX.
For RELATOR: Williams, Jr., Mr. James Lee, Chappell
& McGartland, Fort Worth, TX, McSwain, Mr. Angus E.,
Fulbright Winniford Bice & Marable, Waco, TX, Jung,
Mr. P. Michael, Kizzia, Mr. D. Bradley, Strasburger &
Price, Dallas, TX.
For RESPONDENT: Ragland, Mr. Tom L., Ragland
Mangrum & Young, Waco, TX.
JUDGES: CHIEF JUSTICE PHILLIPS delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE GONZALEZ,
JUSTICE HECHT, JUSTICE ENOCH, JUSTICE
OWEN, and JUSTICE ABBOTT joined. JUSTICE
BAKER filed a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE
CORNYN and JUSTICE SPECTOR joined. JUSTICE
BAKER, joined by JUSTICE CORNYN and JUSTICE
SPECTOR, dissenting.
OPINIONBY: THOMAS R. PHILLIPS
OPINION: 1*591] ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS.
In the workers' compensation suit underlying this original mandamus proceeding, the trial court appointed an
attorney to represent the claimant, ordering the carrier
to pay opposing counsel's fees as the case progressed.
While not challenging the appointment itself, the [**2J
carrier contends that the trial court abused its discretion
and caused irreparable harm by requiring it to pay for the

claimant's attorney. Because we agree, we conditionally
grant the writ of mandamus.
I
Real party in interest Allene Reed, a 49 year-old office administrator, suffered a slip and fall at work while
moving file boxes. Reed contends that she struck her head
on the floor during the fall, aggravating a preexisting medical condition referred to as "syrinx condition and symptomatic, previously compensated hydrocephalus" ("hydrocephalus"). While the record does not contain a lay
definition of this condition, it apparently involves abnormal fluid levels in the cranium.
Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, the
workers' compensation carrier for Reed's employer, denied that Reed's hydrocephalus, if it existed at all, was
caused by or aggravated by her fall. After a benefit review conference failed to resolve this issue, the parties proceeded to a contested case hearing. See TEX.
LAB. CODE § 410.151. Reed was not represented by
counsel at this hearing, although she was assisted by a
Workers' Compensation Commission ombudsman. See id.
§409.041.
The hearing [**3] officer ruled in favor of Reed, concluding that she suffered from preexisting hydrocephalus
aggravated by her on-the-job injury. The hearing officer
further found that Reed had not yet reached maximum
medical improvement, rejecting the contrary conclusion
of the designated doctor. Accordingly, the hearing officer
ordered Travelers to pay temporary income benefits to
Reed until she reached maximum medical improvement
or no longer suffered from a disability, as well as medical
benefits associated with Reed's condition. The record does
not disclose the amount of the temporary income benefits,
which are paid weekly at a rate based on the claimant's
average weekly wage. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 408 103.
Travelers was apparently still paying these weekly benefits at the time of the trial court proceedings which form
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the basis of this complaint.
Travelers appealed to a Commission appeals panel,
which affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Reed again
represented herself in this administrative appeal, apparently without assistance from an ombudsman.
Travelers then filed suit in district court for judicial review of the Commission's decision. See TEX. LAB. CODE
§ 410.251. Reed, appearing [**4] pro se, hied an answer
and a counterclaim seeking "weekly indemnity benefits
for 401 weeks from June 9, 1993; all medical expenses,
costs of court and general relief." nl A short time later,
she filed a motion asking the court to appoint an attorney
for her, to be paid by the county or by Travelers. Reed
contended that, despite diligent efforts, she had been unable to obtain a lawyer to represent her on a contingency
[*592] basis. She further argued that this inability resulted
from the fee restrictions imposed by the new Workers'
Compensation Act, see TEX. LAB. CODE § 408.221,
which became effective in January 1991. See Acts 1989,
71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 17.18. Reed contended that
these restrictions, by depriving her of counsel, violated
her due course, due process and equal protection rights
under the Texas and United States Constitutions. She also
filed an affidavit attesting that she was "too poor to employ
counsel to represent [her] in this case."
nl Although the Workers' Compensation
Commission subsequently intervened in the case
for the purpose of showing "that the decision of the
TWCC Appeals Panel is correct and should be upheld by [the trial court]," see TEX. LAB. CODE §
410.254, no one representing the Commission has
yet appeared at any of the trial court hearings.

to submit fee statements to the court every thirty days,
which Travelers was to pay within thirty days after court
approval of the statements. The court made no provision
for refund of these fees in the event that Travelers was
successful in its appeal, nor did it require Reed to bear
any portion of [**6] the expense out of the weekly benefit checks she was receiving from Travelers. The court
cited no legal authority in support of its order, nor did
it hold any provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
unconstitutional.
A short time later, Travelers nonsuited its claim for
judicial review of the Commission's decision. The case remains pending, however, because of Reed's counterclaim
for long-term indemnity benefits. Although Travelers has
filed special exceptions contending that this counterclaim
is not ripe because Reed has not presented it to the
Commission, the trial court has apparently not yet ruled
on those special exceptions.
On September 14, 1995, after the court approved
Ragland's first fee statement for $1,742, Travelers moved
for reconsideration of the court's order requiring it to pay
Ragland's fees. At the hearing on this motion, Travelers
sought to offer advertisements from the Waco yellow
pages from several lawyers soliciting workers' compensation cases. The court, refusing to consider this evidence
because Travelers had not offered it earlier, overruled
Travelers' motion for reconsideration.
The parties agreed to stay the trial court's order pending mandamus review. [**7] After the court of appeals
denied relief without opinion, Travelers sought relief from
this Court, and we granted leave to file its petition for writ
of mandamus.
II

1**5]
Before the district court, Reed presented live testimony from three lawyers who declined to represent her
because of the fee restrictions and the limitations on total
recovery for claimants. Two of these lawyers also cited
the Act's rule prohibiting attorneys from lending money
to claimants, see TEX. LAB. CODE § 415.007, contending that this restriction prevented them from adequately
developing cases because litigation expenses could not
be advanced. Reed also offered her own testimony that
several other lawyers had refused to represent her because they did not accept cases under the new Workers'
Compensation Act.
After two hearings, the trial court granted Reed's motion, appointing attorney Tom Ragland of Waco to represent her. The court further ordered Travelers to pay
Ragland's reasonable fees approved by the court, at an
hourly rate not to exceed $85. Ragland was authorized

Travelers contends that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring it to pay the fees for Reed's appointed
counsel. Before addressing this issue, it may be helpful
to clarify what is not presented for decision in this mandamus proceeding. Travelers does not here challenge the
trial court's authority to appoint an attorney for Reed, and
thus we do not address the propriety of that portion of the
trial court's order. Moreover, Reed in this Court has abandoned her argument that the attorney's fees provisions of
the Worker's Compensation Act are unconstitutional. We
are thus not called upon to decide whether Reed's evidence regarding her difficulty in obtaining an attorney
demonstrates that the Act unreasonably restricts access
to counsel, see Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n
v. Garcia, 893 S W2d 504, 533 (Tex. 1995) (facial constitutional violation not established based on anecdotal
evidence of attorneys no longer accepting cases under
new Act), or whether any such restriction would entitle
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Reed to [**8] court-appointed counsel See Lassiter v
Department of Social Servs 452 US 18 26-27 68 L
Ed 2d 640, 101 S Ct 2153 (1981) (recognizing [*593]
piesumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only where physical liberty is at stake)
The narrow issue presented is whether the trial court, having appointed an attorney to represent Reed, could require
Travelers to pay the fees for that attorney We conclude
that placing this burden on Travelers constituted an abuse
of discretion
In Texas, attorney's fees may not be recovered from
an opposing party unless such recovery is piovided for by
statute or by contract between the parties See Dallas
Central Appraisal Dist v Seven Investment Co, 835
S W2d 75 77 (Tex 1992), New Amsterdam Cas Co
v Texas Indus, 414 S W2d 914, 915 (Tex 1967) The
authorization of attorney's fees in civil cases may not be
inferred, rather it "must be provided for by the express
terms of the statute in question " Fust City Bank-Farmers
Branch v Guex, 677 SW2d 25, 30 (Tex 1984)
There is no statute which authorizes recovery of attorney's fees under the circumstances of this case To the
contiary, [**9] the Workers'Compensation Act provides
that the claimant's attorney's fee "shall be paid from the
claimant's recovery," TEX LAB CODE § 408 221(b), n2
with two exceptions, neither of which is present here
The first exception applies where an insurance carrier
unsuccessfully challenges a Commission order awarding
supplemental income benefits See id § 408 147(c) In
that situation, the claimant is entitled to lecover reasonable attorney's fees in addition to any acciued benefits
Id Because there has been no Commission determination
that Reed is entitled to supplemental income benefits, this
exception clearly does not apply here The second exception allows claimants to recover attorney's fees when
suing to enfoice a final order of the Commission which
the carrier has failed to comply with See TEX LAB
CODE § 410 208 Because a Commission older which is
timely appealed for judicial review is not "final," see id §
410 205(a), this provision likewise does not apply in this
case
n2 This fee must be approved by the
Commission or court based on such factors as the
time and labor required, the difficulty of the issues, and the amount in controversy, see TEX LAB
CODE $ 408 221 (a), (c), and it generally cannot exceed 25 percent of the claimant's recovery See id
§408 221(h)

[*no]
Reed also does not contend that she may recover at-

torney's fees based on any agreement between the parties Specifically, she does not claim that the workers'
compensation insurance contract between her employer
and Travelers authorizes her recovery of attorney's fees
Indeed, she cannot do so, as section 38 001 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which generally authorizes recovery of attorney's fees for suits on a written
contract, does not apply to insurance contracts subject
to article 2121 of the Texas Insurance Code See TEX
CIV PRAC & REM CODE § 38 006 The compensation
policy issued by Travelers falls within this exception See
Aetna Cas & Sur Co v Marshall, 724 S W2d 770 772
(Tex 1987)
Instead, Reed attempts to justify the trial court's order
under section 24 016 of the Texas Government Code and
under the trial court's inherent authority We address each
purported justification
The Government Code vests district judges with the
following discretion to appoint counsel
A district judge may appoint counsel to attend to the cause of a party who makes an
affidavit that he is too poor to employ counsel to attend to the cause
TEX [**11] GOV'T CODE §24 016 Whatever the
reach of this provision, it contains no language authorizing judges to shift the fees for appointed counsel to
the opposing party, and it has never been so interpreted
Because the authonty for a fee award "may not be supplied by implication but must be provided for by the express terms of the statute in question," Guex, 677 S W2d
at 30, we may not construe section 24 016 as impliedly
authorizing a trial court to place the financial burden of
appointed counsel on the opposing party
The original statutory predecessor to section 24 016
provided as follows
The judges in any case, civil or criminal,
in which a party may swear that he is too
poor to employ counsel, shall appoint counsel [*594J for such party, who shall attend
to the cause in behalf of such party without
any fee or reward
Act of May 11, 1846, §11, reprinted m 2 H GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 1509 (1898) (emphasis added)
Because the Legislature subsequently amended the statute
by deleting the requirement that appointed counsel serve
without fee or reward, Reed argues that the Legislature
must have intended to vest distnct judges with the authority to place [**12J the financial burden of appointed
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counsel on the opposing party We disagree It is more
likely that the Legislature simply wanted to remove any
impediment to appointed counsel receiving attorney's fees
from some other source, e g , from the indigent claimant's
recovery, from local or state government, or from the opposing party if independently authorized by agreement or
some other fee-shifting statute Had the Legislatuie intended to authonze the shifting of attorney's fees to the
opposing party under section 24 016 or its piecursors,
we believe it would have expressly said so See Guex
677 S W2dat 30 ("If the legislatuie had intended recovery of attorney's fees under [section 9 507(a) of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code], they would no doubt have
provided for it
")
Reed next contends that, even if the trial court
lacked statutory authority to impose attorney's fees against
Travelers, it had inherent authority to do so A trial court
has certain inherent power derived "from the very fact that
the court has been cieated and charged by the constitution
with certain duties and responsibilities " Eichelbergei v
Eichelbeigei 582 SW2d395 398 (Tex 1979) 1**131 A
couit may call upon its inheient poweis "to aid in the exel cise of its junsdiction, in the administration of justice,
and in the pieservation of its independence and integrity "
Id
While a court has the duty to ensure that "judicial proceedings remain truly adversary in nature," Public Utility
Comm'n v Cofer 754 S W2d 121 124 (Tex 1988) we
have never held that a civil litigant must be represented
by counsel in older for a court to carry on its essential,
constitutional function Cf Lassiter 452 US at 26-27
Indeed, thousands of cases each year are prosecuted in our
courts by pro se litigants Nevertheless, we lecognize that
in some exceptional cases the public and private interests
at stake are such that the administration ofjustice may best
be served by appointing a lawyer to lepresent an indigent
civil litigant But because Tiavelers does not challenge
Ragland's appointment, we need not decide whether the
trial court had inherent authority in this case to appoint
an attorney Moreover, even if Travelers had challenged
Ragland's appointment, it would not be necessary to address the issue under the trial court's inherent authority,
as section 24 016 [**14] expressly grants district judges
disci etion to appoint counsel for indigent litigants
Whatever the extent of the trial court's inherent authority, however, it does not extend to requiring Traveleis
to pay Ragland's fees Theie is no indication in the lecord
before us that the tual couit could only have earned out
its constitutional function by imposing this fee buiden on
Travelers In the absence of such a showing, allowing tual
courts to exercise this power under the guise of "inheient
authority" would constitute a judicial end-run around the

statutory fee-shifting scheme We therefore reject Reed's
argument that the trial court had inherent authority for its
actions
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by requiring Travelers to pay the fees
of Reed's appointed counsel
III
To be entitled to mandamus relief, Travelers must also
demonstrate that it has no adequate remedy by appeal
See Walker v Packer 827 S W2d 833 842 (Tex 1992)
Travelers does not dispute that it may challenge the trial
court's order on regular appeal and, if successful, that it
will obtain the right to recover the disputed attorney's fees
While [**15] there is no guarantee that Travelers will actually be able to collect the fees, this uncertainty in and of
itself does not render the appellate remedy inadequate In
Street v Second Court of Appeals 715 S W2d 638 63940 (Tex 1986) for example, where the tual couit assessed
attorney's fees as a discovery [*595] sanction, we held
that an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because
of the uncertainty of recovery on appeal
The piesent case is different, however The trial court
did not merely require Travelers to pay an isolated attorney's fee as a sanction Rather, it required Travelers
to fund, on a monthly basis, all of Reed's attorney's fees
throughout the litigation Requiring a party to advance
the litigation costs of the opposition in addition to its own
expenses so skews the litigation process that any subsequent remedy by appeal is inadequate The party receiving a "free ride" under such an order has little incentive
to resolve the dispute economically and efficiently, and
may even be encouraged to deliberately protract the proceedings to encourage a favorable settlement Further, the
litigation strategy of the party bearing the expenses will
be unfairly |**16] hindered, knowing that at each step,
whether it be trial, a hearing, a deposition, or the issuance
of written discovery, it must bear the expenses of both
sides n3
n3 We emphasize that we are articulating general policy concerns, and that we have no reason to
believe that Mr Ragland would engage in bad faith
or abusive litigation tactics
We have recognized that, in the discovery context,
remedy by appeal will be inadequate where the ti lal court's
eiTor vitiates or severely compromises a party's ability to
present a viable claim or defense See Walker 827 S W2d
at 843 While the trial court's error in this case does not
affect Travelers' ability to present the substance of its
defense, it radically skews the procedural dynamics of
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the case. Under these unusual circumstances, the remedy by regular appeal is inadequate. See Transamerican
Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W2d 913, 919 (Tex.
1991) (eventual remedy by appeal from trial court's interlocutory order imposing death penalty sanction is [**17]
inadequate because "the entire conduct of the litigation is
skewed" by the imposition of the sanction).
For the foregoing reasons, we conditionally grant the
writ of mandamus. The trial court is directed to vacate
that portion of its order requiring Travelers to bear the
expense of Reed's appointed lawyer.
Thomas R. Phillips
Chief Justice
Opinion Delivered: May 31, 1996
DISSENTBY: James A. Baker
DISSENT:
I respectfully dissent.
Once again, the Court ignores previously wellestablished mandamus standards and awards extraordinary relief because it simply disagrees with the trial court's
ruling. I agree with the Court that the trial court abused
its discretion, but ordinary appeal provides Travelers an
adequate remedy.
In 1992, this Court specifically disapproved cases al-

lowing mandamus relief absent a showing by the relator that ordinary appeal was not adequate to correct a
trial court's abuse of discretion. See Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. / ^ ( d i s a p p r o v i n g Barker
v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977) and Allen v.
Humphreys, 559 S. W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977) along with "any
other authorities to the extent they might be read as abolishing [**18] or relaxing this rule."). In Walker, the Court
called the policy allowing mandamus only where there is
no adequate remedy by appeal "sound" policy. Walker,
827 S. W.2d at 842. Indeed, it is sound policy. We should
uphold the policy, not just recite it.
Here, the Court purports to abide by Walker's mandate. However, in its rush to remedy the trial court's
wrong, the Court ignores the Walker standard. I find
this unfortunate. The Court should adhere to basic principles of stare decisis and hold that Travelers must, as any
other party seeking mandamus relief, "demonstrate that
the remedy offered by ordinary appeal is inade-quate."
Walker, 827 S.W2d at 842. Travelers has not met this
standard. In fact, Travelers "does not dispute that it may
challenge the trial court's order on regular appeal."
S.W.2d at . Instead, Travelers, like this Court, simply
thinks the trial court acted outside its discretion and that
a quick fix is deserved. This is not enough for mandamus.
Accordingly, I dissent.
James A. Baker, Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: May 31, 1996

